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Beyond Maryland v. Craig: Can and Should
Adult Rape Victims Be Permitted to Testify
by Closed-Circuit Television?
LISA HAMILTON THIELMEYER*
INTRODUCTION
Anna is a rape victim. The man accused of raping her is scheduled to
stand trial next week. Both Anna's psychiatrist and an expert hired by the
state to examine her have determined that Anna would suffer serious
emotional distress and thus be unable to communicate coherently if she
were forced to testify in the presence of the defendant. However, they agree
that Anna would be able to testify over one-way closed-circuit television
with both attorneys and her doctor in the room with her, while the judge,
jury, and the defendant watched from another room.
Whether Anna will be allowed to testify in the manner suggested by the
psychiatrists may depend on her age. In Maryland v. Craig,1 the Supreme
Court held that it is constitutional to permit a child victim of sexual abuse
to testify over one-way closed-circuit television when necessary to protect
the child from the trauma of testifying in the presence of the defendant. 2
However, the question of whether the identical procedure would be consti-
tutional when applied to an adult victim has not been addressed by the
Supreme Court.
Although the technique upheld in Craig is governed by a statute' that
applies only to victims of child abuse,4 in the absence of an explicit statute,
it would still be possible to allow any witness to testify over one-way closed-
circuit television by using the unavailability exception to the hearsay rule.5
* J.D. Candidate, 1992, Indiana University School of Law at Bloomington; B.A., 1989,
Indiana University.
1. 110 S. Ct. 3157 (1990).
2. Id. at 3170.
3. MD. Crs. & Jur. PRoc. CODE ANN. § 9-102 (1989). For the full text of the statute,
see infra note 73.
4. Numerous states have statutes creating alternative ways for child abuse victims to
testify. See infra notes 45-49 and accompanying text.
5. Federal Rule of Evidence 804, which codifies the unavailability exception to the hearsay
rule, will be the basis of the discussion of that exception throughout this Note. Testimony by
closed-circuit television, even if shown live during a trial, must still be viewed as hearsay.
Graham, Indicia of Reliability and Face to Face Confrontation: Emerging Issues in Child
Sexual Abuse Prosecutions, 40 U. MIA L. Rnv. 19, 90 (1985). But see Craig, 110 S. Ct. at
3167 (The Supreme Court declined to hold that testimony by closed-circuit television is hearsay,
although noting that it may technically be considered out-of-court testimony.).
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To do this, the judge would first make a finding that the witness was
"unavailable" because she would be essentially unable to communicate in
the presence of the defendant due to her emotional trauma. 6 Once the
witness was declared unavailable, any statement made by the witness over
closed-circuit television and subject to cross-examination by the defendant's
attorney would be admissible under the prior testimony exception to the
hearsay rule. 7 The use of any rule of evidence to admit hearsay is, of
course, limited by the confrontation clause of the sixth amendment to the
United States Constitution.' Thus, the question remains whether the tech-
nique used in Craig would pass constitutional muster if it were applied to
adults.
The answer to that question must be found in the Court's analysis of the
confrontation clause, both historically and in the Craig opinion. Therefore,
Part I of this Note will examine the confrontation clause and its historical
relationship to exceptions to the hearsay rule. Part II will examine the
Court's application of the confrontation clause to statutes designed to
protect child witnesses, culminating in Craig. Finally, Part III will assess
whether adult rape victims could, and should, constitutionally be afforded
similar protection, either by statute or through application of the unavail-
ability exception to the hearsay rule.
I. THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE
The Supreme Court, in holding the confrontation clause applicable to the
states through the fourteenth amendment, stated: "There are few subjects,
perhaps, upon which this Court and other courts have been more nearly
unanimous than in their expressions of belief that the right of confrontation
and cross-examination is an essential and fundamental requirement for the
6. A witness who "is unable to be present or to testify at the hearing because of death
or then existing physical or mental illness or infirmity" is considered unavailable. FED. R.
Evm. 804(a)(4).
7. FED. R. EviD. 804(b)(1). The rule provides that the following is not excluded as hearsay
if the declarant is unavailable:
Testimony given as a witness at another hearing of the same or a different
proceeding, or in a deposition taken in compliance with law in the course of the
same or another proceeding, if the party against whom the testimony is now
offered ... had an opportunity and similar motive to develop the testimony by
direct, cross, or redirect examination.
See infra notes 133-40 and accompanying text for an application of this rule to closed-circuit
television testimony.
8. See California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 155 (1970) ("[It is a mistake to say that] the
Confrontation Clause is nothing more or less than a codification of the rules of hearsay and
their exceptions as they existed historically at common law."). But see Jonakait, Restoring the
Confrontation Clause to the Sixth Amendment, 35 UCLA L. REv. 557, 574 (1988) ("The
confrontation clause is not now a constitutional provision controlling evidence law. Instead,
evidence law dominates the confrontation right.").
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kind of fair trial which is this country's constitutional goal." 9 Unfortunately,
there has not always been such consensus in defining exactly what the
"right ... to be confronted with the witnesses against him" 10 entails,"
especially when out-of-court statements are involved.' 2 It is important,
therefore, to understand the way in which the Supreme Court's view of the
confrontation clause has evolved historically in order to determine how
modem confrontation clause problems should be approached.
The Supreme Court first defined the "primary object" of the confron-
tation clause as being
to prevent depositions or ex parte affidavits ... being used against the
prisoner in lieu of a personal examination and cross-examination of the
witness in which the accused has an opportunity, not only of testing the
recollection and sifting the conscience of the witness, but of compelling
him to stand face to face with the jury in order that they may look at
him, and judge by his demeanor upon the stand and the manner in
which he gives his testimony whether he is worthy of belief.'
3
This statement of the purpose behind the confrontation clause is consistent
with the perception that Sir Walter Raleigh's 1603 trial for treason had a
major influence on the development of the common law right to confron-
tation.14 During his trial, Raleigh, whose conviction was based primarily
upon the written confession of an absent co-conspirator, demanded to
"[c]all [his] accuser before [his] face."' 5 This statement symbolizes the long-
established belief behind the confrontation clause: "It is always more
difficult to tell a lie about a person 'to his face' than 'behind his back.'
'1 6
The Court later recognized, however, that an absolute requirement of
face-to-face confrontation would "abrogate virtually every hearsay excep-
tion, a result long rejected as unintended and too extreme.' ' 7 Thus, the
Court held in California v. Green8 that an out-of-court statement by a
9. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 405 (1965).
10. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
11. See Owen, Recent Development, The Confrontation Clause Applied to Minor Victims
of Sexual Abuse, 42 VAD. L. Ra-v. 1511, 1515 (1989) (Not even the Supreme Court claims
to know the intent of the framers of the confrontation clause.).
12. See Jonakait, supra note 8, at 558-59.
13. Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 242-43 (1895).
14. F. HEUER, THE SixTH Am:ENDENTr 104 (1951) (citations omitted). But see Graham,
The Right of Confrontation and the Hearsay Rule: Sir Walter Raleigh Loses Another One, 8
Cui.. L. BUu. 99, 100 n.4 (1972) (The story of Sir Waiter Raleigh's contribution to the right
of confrontation is merely a "convenient but highly romantic myth.").
15. 2 T. Howna, A Comp=ETE CoUECToN OF STATE T1UAIs 15-16 (1816), quoted in
Graham, supra note 14, at 100.
16. Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1019 (1988). This same idea was immortalized by
Shakespeare in Richard II, act 1, scene 1: "Then call them to our presence-face to face, and
frowning brow to brow, ourselves will hear the accuser and the accused freely speak ....
(quoted in Coy, 487 U.S. at 1016).
17. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 63 (1980).
18. 399 U.S. 149 (1970).
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witness present at trial could constitutionally be admitted if three distinct
criteria mandated by the confrontation clause were met: the witness gave
testimony under oath at trial; the witness was subjected to cross-examination
by the defendant at trial; and, finally, the jury was able to observe the
witness's demeanor in order to assess his or her credibility. 9 Thus, even
though the witness's out-of-court statement may not have been made under
the above conditions, the Court held that the defendant's right to confront
the witness concerning the statement would be satisfied as long as the
witness was available to be cross-examined about it at trial. 20
Justice Harlan wrote a concurring opinion in Green in which he expressed
his disapproval of the tendency of lower courts and commentators to
misinterpret the Supreme Court decisions concerning the confrontation
clause as equating "confrontation" and "cross-examination.' 12 As Justice
Harlan noted, this misinterpretation is "understandable'" considering the
seemingly explicit language in numerous Supreme Court opinions suggesting
just such an equation.23 Harlan believed that all such language should be
considered dicta; under the Supreme Court's analysis, the right to confron-
tation was and should be "confined to an availability rule, one that requires
the production of a witness when he is available to testify." 24 Under this
view, common law hearsay exceptions permitting statements made by una-
vailable declarants to be admitted would be constitutional, even though
some of them do not require that the defendant have the opportunity for
cross-examination.2Y
In Ohio v. Roberts,26 the Court, consistent with the ideas expressed by
Justice Harlan in Green, broadened the exceptions to the confrontation
clause by establishing a two-prong test for admitting out-of-court statements
19. Id. at 158.
20. Id. ("[1]f the declarant is present and testifying at trial, the out-of-court statement for
all practical purposes regains most of the lost protections [guaranteed by the three criteria for
admission].").
21. Id. at 172 (Harlan, J., concurring).
22. Id. (Harlan, J., concurring).
23. See, e.g., Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 406-07 (1965) ("[A] major reason underlying
the constitutional confrontation rule is to give a defendant charged with crime an opportunity
to cross-examine the witnesses against him.").
24. Green, 399 U.S. at 182 (Harlan, J., concurring).
25. An example is the dying declarations exception to the hearsay rule, now codified in
Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(2). Note, however, that Justice Harlan joined the majority in
disputing the idea that the confrontation clause was meant by its framers as merely a way to
constitutionalize common law hearsay rules. Green, 399 U.S. at 179 (Harlan, J., concurring)
("That the Clause was intended to ordain common law rules of evidence with constitutional
sanction is doubtful .... Rather, having established a broad principle, it is far more likely
that the Framers anticipated it would be supplemented, as a matter of judge-made common
law, by prevailing rules of evidence.").
26. 448 U.S. 56.
[Vol. 67:797
TELEVISION TESTIMONY
made by unavailable declarants.27 First, the proponent of the statement
must prove that the declarant is unavailable to testify at trial.2 Then the
Court requires that the statement "bear[] adequate indicia of reliability," 29
which will be inferred if "the evidence falls within a firmly rooted hearsay
exception. 3 0 If the statement cannot be admitted under a "firmly rooted"
hearsay exception, it may still be admitted if the circumstances in which it
was made provide it with a "particularized guarantee of trustworthiness. ' 3
A reliable statement is admissible without actual confrontation because the
statement will still further the purpose of the confrontation clause-en-
hancing the reliability of the truth-finding functions of a criminal trial.3 2
Thus, the Court has established that "the right to confront and to cross-
examine is not absolute and may, in appropriate cases, bow to accommodate
other legitimate interests in the criminal trial process. '33 The Court now
views the confrontation clause as reflecting a "preference" for face-to-face
confrontation, 34 allowing the admission of certain "reliable" hearsay evi-
dence and opening the door for states to attempt to define interests that
outweigh this "preference." One such state interest is, as Craig demon-
strates, the protection of the psychological well-being of child abuse victims
who give testimony against their alleged abusers.
II. THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE VERSUS THE PROTECTION
OF CHILD ABUSE VICTIMS
The problem of sexual abuse of children has become one of tremendous
public interest over the past few years. This is understandable if, as studies
suggest, as many as one in every three adult women in this country today
was sexually abused when she was a child. 35 Unfortunately, a majority of
27. In other words, when application of the unavailability exception to the hearsay rule is
constitutional.
28. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 65.
29. Id. at 65-66.
30. Id. at 66. For a discussion of the difficulty of applying the "firmly rooted" standard
and a suggestion that a case-by-case determination of the reliability of the hearsay statement
involved should replace it, see Goldman, Not So "Firmly Rooted". Exceptions to the
Confrontation Clause, 66 N.C.L. REv. 1 (1987).
31. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66 (footnote omitted).
32. E.g., Maryland v. Craig, 110 S. Ct. 3157, 3163-64 (1990).
33. Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 295 (1973) (citation omitted).
34. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 63.
35. AmmucAN BAR ASSOCIATION GUIDELINES FOR THE FAIR TREATMENT OF CHILD WITNESSES
rN CASES WHERE CHILD ABUSE Is ALLEGED 7 (1985) (approved by the ABA Board of Delegates
in 1985) (citing Finkelhor, How Widespread Is Child Sexual Abuse?, in PERSPECTrES ON
CHILD MA.TR.ATMmr IN Tm MI '80's 18, 19 (Nat'l Center on Child Abuse & Neglect, U.S.
Dept. of Health & Human Services 1984)).
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child sexual abuse cases are never reported,3 6 and prosecution of those that
are is often made difficult by the fact that the child victim's testimony is
the only real evidence available. 7 The ability of some child witnesses to
communicate can be severely hampered, indeed sometimes eliminated alto-
gether, by the trauma of testifying in front of the alleged abuser.3" Although
the experience can be psychologically detrimental to some children, 9 it
should be noted that not all child sexual abuse victims are traumatized by
testifying in court. In fact, "[a]ttorneys and psychologists that were present
at a conference on child sexual abuse unanimously reported that a great
majority of children are capable of testifying at trial without much diffi-
culty."940
When a child would be traumatized by testifying, forcing her to do so
would not only be damaging to her, but also could prove fruitless, "un-
dermining the truth-finding function of the trial itself.' 41 This results from
a child's reluctance, or even inability, to testify in front of the defendant.
"The physical presence of a defendent [sic] who is a threatening figure in
a child's life ... along with the stigmatizing and guilt-provoking presence
of the general public, often constitute the primary impediments to a child's
ability to testify about sexual abuse." 42
Conversely, many believe that permitting children to testify out of the
defendant's presence undermines the truth-finding process. They feel that
face-to-face confrontation enhances the ability of juries to detect false
accusers and that allowing a witness to testify without facing the defendant
36. Finkelhor, supra note 35, at 18; see also Russell, The Incidence and Prevalence of
Intrafamilial and Extrafamilial Sexual Abuse of Female Children, 7 CmILD ABUSE & NEGLECT
133, 145 (1983) ("[O]nly a minute percentage of [child sexual abuse] cases ever get reported
to the police.").
37. Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 60 (1987); see also Berliner, The Child Witness:
The Progress and Emerging Limitations, 40 U. MrAMI L. REv. 167, 171 (1985) ("Most cases
involve only the child and the offender, without the traditional corroborative evidence such
as medical or physical findings, or witnesses to the crime.") (citing Radbill, A History of
Child Abuse and Infanticide, in TmE BATTERED CmD 3, 17 (Helfer & Kempe eds. 1974)).
38. "T]o a child who does not understand the reason for confrontation, the anticipation
and experience of being in close proximity to the defendant can be overwhelming." D.
Wmrco~mi, E. SHAPiRo & L. STELLWAGEN, WIEN THE VICTIM IS A CHILD: IssUEs FOR JUDGES
AND PROSECUTORS 17-18 (1985), quoted in Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1031 (1988) (Blackmun,
J., dissenting).
39. See, e.g., Berliner, supra note 37, at 172.
40. Graham, supra note 5, at 83 n.141. In fact, "[clounselors have found that children
sometimes psychologically benefit by participating in the criminal justice system." Berliner,
supra note 37, at 174-75; see also Melton, Child Witnesses and the First Amendment: A
Psychological Dilemma, 40 J. Soc. IssUEs 109, 120 (1984) ("[I]t is conceivable that for some
youngsters the opportunity to have their day in court would be cathartic and symbolically put
an end to the episode in their minds.").
41. Coy, 487 U.S. at 1032 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
42. MacFarlane, Diagnostic Evaluations and the Use of Videotapes in Child Sexual Abuse
Cases, 40 U. MIAMI L. REv. 135, 149 (1985) (Kee MacFarlane is the director of the Child
Sexual Abuse Diagnostic Center of the Children's Institute International in Los Angeles.).
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makes it easier for her to lie on the witness stand.43 This concern is especially
relevant where child victims are concerned because many fear that child
victims are often "brainwashed" into "remembering" abuse that never
happened or are encouraged by adults to exaggerate their stories, making
the risk of false accusations by children very great. 4
In response to the growing problem of child sexual abuse and increased
public concern over the detrimental effect that testifying in court had on
some child victims, state legislatures began searching for ways to protect
child witnesses from emotional trauma. Various methods have been imple-
mented, including closing the courtroom to the public while the child
testifies, 4 creating hearsay exceptions to admit certain out-of-court state-
ments made by child victims,46 allowing child victims to testify on videotape
instead of live in the courtroom, 47 using one-way mirrors or screens to keep
43. See supra notes 13-16 and accompanying text.
44. But see Berliner, supra note 37, at 177 ("There is no real support for this contention.
It is not clear that it is even possible to induce children to describe an experience they never
had.").
45. Twenty-six states have statutes allowing judges to close courtrooms while child victims
of sexual abuse testify. See Forman, Note, To Keep the Balance True: The Case of Coy v.
Iowa, 40 HAsTinGs L.J. 437, 443 & n.45 (1989).
In Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596 (1982), the Supreme Court held
unconstitutional a Massachusetts statute that allowed such courtroom closure in all cases
involving child sex abuse victims. However, the Court did not hold that closing courtrooms
in such circumstances would always be unconstitutional; instead, it advised that a case-by-case
analysis of the individual need for closure should be undertaken to insure that the child's need
for protection outweighs the first amendment rights of the public and the press. The Court
suggested that such factors as the age and psychological maturity of the victim, the nature of
the crime involved, the desires of the child victim, and the interests of the child's parents and
relatives should be used to determine whether and to what degree the individual child involved
would be harmed by testifying in open court. Id. at 608.
46. Twenty-two states have enacted specific hearsay exceptions for out-of-court statements
made by child victims. See Forman, supra note 45, at 442 & n.34. It is also possible for such
statements to be admitted under the residual exception to the hearsay rule if the child is
deemed unavailable to testify and the court determines that the statement has "circumstantial
guarantees of trustworthiness." FED. R. EvID. 804(b)(5).
The Supreme Court has refused to "read into the Confrontation Clause a preconceived and
artificial litmus test for the procedural propriety of professional interviews in which children
make hearsay statements against a defendant." Idaho v. Wright, 110 S. Ct. 3139, 3148 (1990).
This suggests that even in states where there are statutory hearsay exceptions for child victims
the confrontation clause requires a case-by-case showing of the reliability of any statement
offered under such an exception. For a detailed discussion of the use of such hearsay exceptions,
see Graham, supra note 5, at 21-61.
47. Videotaped testimony by child victims of sexual abuse is permitted in thirty-seven
states. See Maryland v. Craig, 110 S. Ct. 3157, 3167 & n.2 (1990). State courts have given
these statutes varied treatment. See, e.g., State v. Jarzbek, 204 Conn. 683, 704-05, 529 A.2d
1245, 1255 (1987) (requiring a case-by-case determination that taking the videotaped deposition
outside the presence of the defendant was necessary to insure that the reliability of the child's
testimony would not be precluded by the trauma of seeing the defendant), cert. denied, 487
U.S. 1061 (1988); State v. Lamb, 14 Kan. App. 2d 664, 671, 798 P.2d 506, 510-11 (finding
Craig criteria satisfied by a videotaped interview admitted pursuant to a Kansas statute; the
interview provided "sufficient indicia" of reliability and the trial judge had the opportunity
at a pretrial hearing to evaluate the potential trauma to the witness).
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the defendant out of the child's sight,4 and, finally, using closed-circuit
television to permit the child to testify without being exposed to the
defendant. 49
Few would argue with the proposition that the goal of protecting children,
especially children who have been victimized, is an admirable one. However,
any procedure that allows a child to testify without providing for actual,
physical confrontation with the defendant has the potential to violate the
defendant's sixth amendment rights.5 0 Therefore, the use of any of the
methods listed above is subject to constitutional scrutiny.
A. Coy v. Iowa
The first method considered by the Supreme Court, in Coy v. Iowa,5
was a statute which allowed children testifying about sexual abuse to testify
behind a screen without having to see the defendant. 2 The defendant was
able to see and hear the child and confer with his attorney during the
child's testimony.53 Coy, who had been charged with sexually assaulting two
thirteen-year-old girls, objected to the use of the screen, arguing that the
confrontation clause gave him the right to face-to-face confrontation with
his accusers.5 4
The Court was once again faced with attempting to delineate the guar-
antees inherent in the confrontation clause. Justice Scalia, writing for the
majority, outlined the history of the right to confront one's accusers, going
as far back as Paul's treatment as a prisoner of the Roman Governor
Festus55 and the literal Latin derivation of the word "confront. ' 56 The
opinion is "embellished with references to and quotations from antiquity
in part to convey that there is something deep in human nature that regards
face-to-face confrontation between accused and accuser as 'essential to a
48. This is the procedure found unconstitutional in Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012 (1988).
See infra notes 51-71 and accompanying text for a discussion of Coy.
49. Child abuse victims may testify by one-way closed-circuit television in twenty-four
states, and eight states allow the use of two-way systems. Craig, 110 S. Ct. at 3168 & nn.3 &
4. This procedure is constitutional under certain circumstances. Id. See infra notes 67-89 and
accompanying text for a discussion of Craig.
50. See supra notes 9-15 and accompanying text.
51. 487 U.S. 1012.
52. Id.
53. IOwA CODE § 910A.14(1) (Supp. 1987) (In 1989, subsection (I) was struck from the
statute.).
54. Coy, 487 U.S. at 1015.
55. Id. at 1015-16 ('It is not the manner of the Romans to deliver any man up to die
before the accused has met his accusers face to face, and has been given a chance to defend
himself against the charges."') (quoting Acts 25:16).
56. The word "confront" is derived from the prefix "con-" (from "contra"), meaning
against, and the noun "frons," meaning forehead. Id. at 1016.
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fair trial in a criminal prosecution."' 5 7 While the Court had recognized
certain exceptions to the right of confrontation in the past, the Coy majority
explained that "[w]e have never doubted.., that the Confrontation Clause
guarantees the defendant a face-to-face meeting with witnesses appearing
before the trier of fact." 58
The difference between the previous exceptions to the right of confron-
tation found constitutional by the Court and the right to a face-to-face
encounter between the defendant and his or her accusers is that the latter
is explicitly guaranteed by the sixth amendment. Unlike the admission of
out-of-court statements or restrictions on cross-examination, face-to-face
confrontation represents the "irreducible literal meaning of the [Confron-
tation] Clause. ' 59 While both cross-examination and face-to-face confron-
tation 'ensur[e] the integrity of the fact-finding process,"'6° the Court held
that the right to cross-examination is more easily outweighed by other
interests because it is merely implicitly included in the sixth amendment.6 1
Thus, the Court declared the statute at issue in Coy unconstitutional because
the statute relied on a generalized finding that testifying in the presence of
the accused can be traumatic for a child victim of sexual abuse, instead of
requiring a particularized finding that the individual witness was in need of
the protection offered by a screen. 62
The Court recognized the possible traumatic effect of forcing a child to
testify in front of the person accused of sexually abusing him or her and
concluded:
[Flace-to-face presence may, unfortunately, upset the truthful rape victim
or abused child; but by the same token it may confound and undo the
false accuser, or reveal the child coached by a malevolent adult. It is a
truism that constitutional protections have costs. 6
However, the majority was unwilling to determine just how great those
costs must be-they "Deft] for another day ... the question whether any
exceptions exist."6' Any exception, however, "would surely be allowed only
when necessary to further an important public policy.1 65
Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion was less cryptic. It emphasized
the problem of child abuse and the need to protect child victims from
57. Id. at 1017 (quoting Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 404 (1965)). The opinion also
refers to a more modem expression of the importance of confrontation-President Eisenhower's
description of the "code" of Abilene, Kansas. "In this country, if someone dislikes you, or
accuses you, he must come up in front. He cannot hide behind the shadow." Id. at 1017-18.
58. Id. at 1016 (citation omitted).
59. Id. at 1021.
60. Id. at 1020 (quoting Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730, 736 (1987)).
61. Id.
62. Id. at 1021.
63. Id. at 1020.
64. Id. at 1021.
65. Id.
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suffering additional trauma in the courtroom. 66 She then rejected any
implication by the majority that the right to face-to-face confrontation is
absolute,67 reiterating the idea that the confrontation clause 'reflects a
preference for face-to-face confrontation at trial' that can be "overcome
in a particular case if close examination of 'competing interests' so war-
rants. ' 68 Agreeing with the majority's suggestion that the proper standard
for any exception would be whether it is "necessary to futher [sic] an
important public policy," 69 Justice O'Connor continued: "The protection
of child witnesses is, in my view and in the view of a substantial number
of the States, just such a policy."' 70 The procedure used in Coy failed to
make an individualized showing of necessity, but a similar statute that did
require such a showing could, in Justice O'Connor's view, pass constitutional
muster.
71
B. Maryland v. Craig
Thus the stage was set for Maryland v. Craig.72 Craig involved a Maryland
statute that permitted child victims to testify over closed-circuit television,
outside of the courtroom and out of the defendant's physical presence, if
"[tihe judge determines that testimony by the child victim in the courtroom
will result in the child suffering serious emotional distress such that the
child cannot reasonably communicate." 73 The defendant in Craig was con-
66. Id. at 1022 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
67. Id. at 1022-24 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
68. Id. at 1024 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (emphasis in original) (quoting Ohio v. Roberts,
448 U.S. 56, 63-64 (1980)).
69. Id. at 1025 (O'Connor, J., concurring); see supra note 65 and accompanying text.
70. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
71. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("[Ilf a court makes a case-specific finding of necessity,
as is required by a number of state statutes ... our cases suggest that the strictures of the
Confrontation Clause may give way to the compelling state interest of protecting child
witnesses.").
72. 110 S. Ct. 3157.
73. MD. CTs. & JuD. PRoc. CODE ANN. § 9-I02(a)(1)(ii) (1989). Section 9-102 reads as
follows:
(a)(1) In a case of abuse of a child as defined in § 5-701 of the Family Law
Article or Article 27, § 35A of the Code, a court may order that the testimony
of a child victim be taken outside the courtroom and shown in the courtroom
by means of a closed-circuit television if:
(i) The testimony is taken during the proceeding; and
(ii) The judge determines that testimony by the child victim in the courtroom
will result in the child suffering serious emotional distress such that the child
cannot reasonably communicate.
(2) Only the prosecuting attorney, the attorney for the defendant, and the judge
may question the child.
(3) The operators of the closed-circuit television shall make every effort to be
unobtrusive.
(b)(1) Only the following persons may be in the room with the child when the
[Vol. 67:797
TELEVISION TESTIMONY
victed of sexually abusing a six-year-old child who had testified at trial
using the procedure prescribed in the statute.74 The child and both attorneys
left the courtroom during the child's testimony, which was then displayed
live to the defendant, judge, and jury over a video monitor; the defendant
was able to communicate with her attorney by electronic means at all
times." The use of this procedure was permitted only after the court heard
expert testimony that the child would suffer emotional distress and 'have
some or considerable difficulty in testifying in Craig's presence.' 7 6
The Supreme Court, with Justice O'Connor writing for the majority,
began its analysis from the premise that the confrontation clause does not
"guarantee[] criminal defendants the absolute right to a face-to-face meeting
with the witnesses against them at trial."" Rather, the purpose of the
confrontation clause is to "ensur[e] that evidence admitted against an
accused is reliable and subject to the rigorous adversarial testing that is the
norm of Anglo-American criminal proceedings. '7 Each element of con-
frontation-including the physical presence of the witness, the taking of an
oath by the witness, cross-examination, and the opportunity for the trier of
fact to observe the demeanor of the witness-contributes to this goal of
reliability. 79 Thus, any proposed exception to one of these elements must
be analyzed "in a manner sensitive to [the clause's] purposes and sensitive
to the necessities of trial and the adversary process."8' 0
The Court then analyzed the Maryland statute in terms of the purpose
of the confrontation clause. Noting that the statute provides for each element
of confrontation except face-to-face confrontation, the Court concluded
child testifies by closed-circuit television:
(i) The prosecuting attorney;
(ii) The attorney for the defendant;
(iH) The operators of the closed-circuit television equipment; and
(iv) Unless the defendant objects, any person whose presence, in the opinion of
the court, contributes to the well-being of the child, including a person who has
dealt with the child in a therapeutic setting concerning the abuse.
(2) During the child's testimony by closed-circuit television, the judge and the
defendant shall be in the courtroom.
(3) The judge and the defendant shall be allowed to communicate with the persons
in the room where the child is testifying by any appropriate electronic method.
(c) The provisions of this section do not apply if the defendant is an attorney
pro se.
(d) This section may not be interpreted to preclude, for purposes of identification
of a defendant, the presence of both the victim and the defendant in the courtroom
at the same time.
74. Craig, 110 S. Ct. at 3160-62.
75. Id. at 3161.
76. Id. (quoting Craig v. State, 316 Md. 551, 568-69, 560 A.2d 1120, 1128-29 (1989)).
77. Id. at 3163 (emphasis in original).
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 3165.
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that the use of one-way closed-circuit television "adequately ensures that
the testimony is both reliable and subject to rigorous adversarial testing in
a manner functionally equivalent to that accorded live, in-person testi-
mony.' 18 The Court was even more supportive of the procedure in dicta,
noting that, to the extent that the child would be unable to testify in front
of the defendant, the use of closed-circuit television "may well aid a
defendant in eliciting favorable testimony from the child witness."8 2
The Court then applied the standard Justice O'Connor had suggested in
her concurring opinion in Coy-whether the procedure was necessary to
further an important state interest-to determine the constitutionality of the
statute. 3 As Justice O'Connor had predicted in Coy,8 the Court found the
state's interest in protecting child abuse victims from the emotional distress
of testifying to be an important one. 8 Thus, if the state could show that
allowing a child victim to testify over one-way closed-circuit television was
necessary to protect that child's emotional well-being, the state's interest in
protecting the child would outweigh the defendant's right to face-to-face
confrontation. 86
The Maryland Court of Appeals, relying on its reading of Coy, had held
that expert testimony regarding the possibility of serious emotional distress
was not sufficient to establish that use of one-way closed-circuit television
was 'necessary."' 8 7 Instead, the court of appeals required that the child's
inability to testify in the presence of the defendant be shown by attempting
to question the child with the defendant present." If that proved unsuc-
cessful, the judge would then be required to determine that the child would
be similarly unable to testify by means of two-way closed-circuit television,
which, by allowing the witness to see the defendant, would more closely
approximate face-to-face confrontation than the one-way method used in
Craig. 89
The Supreme Court declined to interpret Coy as requiring such a strict
showing of necessity. Instead it established three criteria for showing ne-
cessity: (1) the trial court must determine that the procedure is necessary to
protect each particular child who seeks to use it; (2) there must be evidence
that the child would suffer emotional distress specifically from testifying in
81. Id. at 3166.
82. Id. at 3167.
83. Id.
84. See supra notes 66-71 for a discussion of this concurring opinion.
85. Craig, 110 S. Ct. at 3168-69. "[W]e will not second guess the considered judgment of
the Maryland Legislature regarding the importance of its interest in protecting child abuse
victims from the emotional trauma of testifying." Id. at 3169.
86. Id. at 3169.
87. See id. at 3161-62 (quoting Craig, 316 Md. at 556, 560 A.2d at 1127).
88. Id. at 3170 (citation omitted).
89. Id. (citation omitted).
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the presence of the defendant, not merely from testifying in the courtroom;
and (3) the trauma involved must be more than de minimis.9° The trial
court may rely on expert testimony alone to make these findings; 9' subjecting
the child to trauma in order to determine that the child needs protection
from trauma is not necessary. The Court declined to determine the minimum
showing of emotional distress required because the standard of the Maryland
statute, "serious emotional distress such that the child cannot reasonably
communicate,"92 "clearly suffices to meet constitutional standards." 93 The
Court remanded the case, however, because the court of appeals improperly
held that expert testimony alone could not be used to establish that the
children would suffer serious emotional distress from testifying in the
presence of the defendant.9
III. ALLOWING ADULT RAPE VICTIMS TO TESTIFY
BY MEANS OF CLOSED-CIRCUIT TELEVISION
In Maryland v. Craig, 95 the Supreme Court explicitly held that the right
to face-to-face confrontation is not absolute and thus testimony by means
of closed-circuit television may be constitutionally admitted in a criminal
trial when necessary to promote an important public policy. 6 The question
of whether an adult rape victim who would be emotionally traumatized by
testifying in the presence of her alleged rapist can be afforded the same
protection as Craig gives to child victims must, therefore, ultimately depend
on whether protecting adult rape victims is an important public policy.
That rape is a serious problem in the United States is indisputable.9
According to official FBI statistics, there were an estimated 102,555 reported
rapes in the United States in 1990.98 A recent Senate Judiciary Committee
report found that one out of every five American women will be raped
during her lifetime.9 This translates into a woman being raped every six
minutes in the United States.' °° In addition, the number of rapes actually
reported to police each year has steadily increased in the past ten years:
90. Id. at 3169.
91. Id. at 3171.
92. MD. CTS. & JUD. PRoc. CODE ANN. § 9-102(a)(1)(ii) (1989).
93. Craig, 110 S. Ct. at 3169.
94. Id. at 3171.
95. 110 S. Ct. 3157 (1990).
96. See supra notes 72-94 and accompanying text.
97. For an in-depth discussion of the problems of rape and the law, see Estrich, Rape, 95
YALE L.J. 1087 (1986).
98. 1990 FBI UNi. Crnm REPs. 15.
99. 136 CONG. R~c. S16,090-91 (daily ed. Oct. 19, 1990) (statement of Sen. Biden)
[hereinafter Biden Statement] (commenting on SENATE Ju'DcLRY Coa., Tan VIOLENCE
AG;AiNsT WOMN ACT OF 1990: REPORT).
100. Id.
1992]
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there were twenty-four percent more reported rapes in 1990 than there were
in 1981.101
The official statistics only tell part of the story, however. Some studies
indicate that rape is one of the most underreported crimes in the United
States. 0 2 It is estimated that the actual number of rapes is four times the
reported number.103 Of those reported, only one-sixth ultimately lead to a
rape conviction. 04 Although the occurrence of rapes has increased, the
conviction rate of alleged rapists has decreased-in fact, it has fallen thirty
percent since the mid-1960s. 05
A. The Rape Victim and the Legal System
One reason women decide not to report rape is fear of the legal system.'°6
This fear is linked to the psychological distress experienced by rape victims.
One commentator has stated that "rape is without question one of the most
terrifying crimes in which the victim survives ... . [I]ts consequences remain
with the victim for many years or perhaps a lifetime, accounting for deep
psychological problems."" 7 In fact, a recent survey found that rape victims
are five times more likely to attempt suicide than nonvictims. 1°8 The medical
community and the legal system are beginning to recognize that rape victims
often suffer from Rape Trauma Syndrome, a series of psychological reac-
tions to the experience of being raped that affect the victim's entire life-
101. 1990 FBI Uri. Cam REPs. 16. In addition to an increased number of rapes, the rate
of reported rapes has risen steadily according to FBI statistics. Id. But see a recent Bureau of
Justice Statistics report, "Female Victims of Violent Crime," which indicated that a study of
both reported and unreported rapes found a significant decrease in the rate of attempted rapes
between 1973 and 1987-from 1.3 per 1000 women and girls to .7 per 1000. The study also
found that the rate of completed rapes remained unchanged at .6 per 1000 during the same
time period. Rate of Attempted Rape Decreases, Study Says, Chicago Tribune, Jan. 14, 1991,
at 2 (LEXIS; Nexis library, Currnt file).
102. Estrich, supra note 97, at 1163.
103. Id. (citation omitted) (based on a 1965 study containing 15 rapes as its basis of
prediction). Others estimate even higher-up to ten unreported rapes for every one reported.
C. HoRos, RAPE 24 (1974).
104. 133 CONG. Rnc. E1823 (daily ed. May 8, 1987) (statement of Hon. James J. Florio of
New Jersey).
105. Biden Statement, supra note 99, at S16,091.
106. See A. McEvoy & J. BROOKINGS, IF SHE Is RAPED: A BOOK FOR HusBANDs, FATRMS
AND MALE FuaEN-s 43 (1984); see also S. KA'z & M. MAzUR, UNDERSTNDG Tm RAPE
Vicrim 198 (1979) ("Most victims are frightened and confused about appearing in Court....").
107. Sagarin, Forcible Rape and the Problem of the Rights of the Accused, in FoRcmLE
RAPE 142 (1977); see also J. BARKAs, VicmTms 98 (1978) ("Except for murder, the crime of
rape is the ultimate invasion, the one with the most severe physical and psychological
consequences for its victim.").
108. Frazier & Borgida, Rape Trauma Syndrome Evidence in Court, 40 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST
984, 990 (1985).
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style. 1°9 These reactions can include extreme fear, humiliation, anger, and
general anxiety and can continue in varying degrees for several years. 110
Rape victims fear the legal system because a rape trial forces the victim,
who may already be suffering from acute psychological trauma, to relive
the terrifying experience of the attack. For the victim, the criminal justice
system can be "torturous, vexing, embarrassing and uncertain." '' The
experience of publicly testifying about the rape and facing the rapist in
court can add to the already devastating emotional effect of the attack."2
In addition, rape trials tend to focus on the victim rather than on the
defendant or the offense." 3 Because there are often no witnesses to corrob-
orate the rape victim's testimony, many rape trials consist primarily of the
victim's word against that of the defendant, leading the defense attorney
to attempt to destroy the victim's credibility by showing that she actually
consented to having sex with the defendant." 4 This is often accomplished
through a "brutal cross-examination" of the victim, including detailed
questions about what actually occurred during the alleged rape" 5 and the
suggestion that the victim really "asked for it." The use of this tactic makes
the trial process even more devastating for rape victims and contributes to
the nonreporting of rape.Y6
Prior to the early 1970s, defense attorneys had an additional tool: the
ability to conduct a detailed, and often cruel, cross-examination concerning
the victim's sexual history and practices." 7 This tactic was permitted by a
109. Massaro, Experts, Psychology, Credibility, and Rape: The Rape Trauma Syndrome
Issue and Its Implications for Expert Psychological Testimony, 69 MINN. L. Rav. 395, 425-26
(1985). Rape Trauma Syndrome is defined as "the acute phase and long-term reorganization
process that occurs as a result of forcible rape or attempted forcible rape." Id. at 425 n.127
(citation omitted).
110. Id. at 425-26.
111. S. KATz & M. MAtuR, supra note 106, at 198 (citation omitted).
112. See A. McEvoy & J. BROOKINGS, supra note 106, at 58. But see id. at 57 (For some
rape victims, testifying at trial can be therapeutic.).
113. Morris, Note, The Empirical, Historical and Legal Case Against the Cautionary
Instruction: A Call for Legislative Reform, 1988 Dusra L.J. 154, 160.
114. Id. at 160-61.
115. Luban, Partisanship, Betrayal and Autonomy in the Lawyer-Client Relationship: A
Reply to Stephen Ellmann, 90 CoLutM. L. Rav. 1004, 1028 (1990). In the course of this "brutal
cross-examination" concerning the rape itself
the lawyer must play to the jurors' deeply rooted cultural fantasies about feminine
sexual voracity and vengefulness .... [W]ithout seeming like a bully, the advocate
must humiliate and browbeat the prosecutrix, knowing that if she blows up she
will seem less sympathetic, while if she pulls inside herself emotionally she loses
credibility as a victim.
Id. Luban argues that the use of such cross-examination is morally wrong and unnecessary to
fulfill the advocate's role of "the protection of individuals [including both defendants and
victims] against institutions that pose chronic threats to their wellbeing." Id. at 1029.
116. Id. at 1030.
117. Winters, Note, United States v. Shaw: What Constitutes an "Injury" Under the Federal
Rape-Shield Statute?, 43 U. Msmi L. Ray. 947, 951 (1989).
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rape exception to the common law rule that excluded character evidence
because its potential for prejudice outweighed its probative value." 8 This
exception was based on three commonly-held, yet generally unsupported,
beliefs: that an "unchaste" woman, one who had previously participated
in extramarital sexual activity, was more likely to have given consent to her
alleged rapist; that committing the immoral act of extramarital sex im-
peached the complaining witness; and that rape charges were frequently
fabricated and difficult to defend, necessitating rules to help the innocent
defendant with his defense. 1 9 The admission of such evidence caused a great
deal of humiliation for many rape victims who testified at trial, contributing
to their reluctance to report and testify about rape. 20
B. Protecting the Rape Victim: Rape Shield Laws
In response to the unfounded bases for the rule allowing evidence of the
past sexual practices of rape victims,' 2' demands for the protection of rape
victims from unnecessary humiliation during rape trials, and the desire to
encourage rape victims to report the crime, legislatures began to pass rape
shield laws. The federal version of the rape shield law, Federal Rule of
Evidence 412, was passed in 1978.22 Like the typical rape shield law, it
does not merely eliminate the common law exception to the character
evidence rule. 23 Instead, it gives rape victims protection in addition to that
given other witnesses' 24 by allowing evidence of a rape victim's sexual history
to be admitted only when required by due process. 21
118. Id. at 953-54.
119. Tanford & Bocchino, Rape Victim Shield Laws and the Sixth Amendment, 128 U. PA.
L. REv. 544, 546 (1980). Dean Wigmore, among other commentators, has asserted that false
accusations of rape are more likely than false accusations of other crimes because of various
psychological derangements that lead women to "cry rape." Massaro, supra note 109, at 418
(citation omitted). Thus, the argument goes, defendants accused of rape must be afforded
special protection against wrongful convictions. Id. There is little evidence to support such a
belief, and, in fact, there is ample evidence that suggests that, because of the difficulty of
winning a rape case, prosecutors "rarely go to trial unless their case is airtight," making it
less likely for a rape defendant to be falsely tried and convicted than those accused of other
violent crimes. R. ToNo, WOMEN, SEX, AND THE LAW 101 (1984); see also Massaro, supra
note 109, at 422 ("[R]ape victims are the least successful among all victims of violent crimes
in proving their claims."); Morris, supra note 113, at 160 (citation omitted) ("[T]he conviction
rates indicate that rape is the easiest accusation of violent crime to disprove.").
120. Winters, supra note 117, at 957.
121. See supra note 119.
122. FED. R. EvD. 412.
123. Tanford & Bocchino, supra note 119, at 545.
124. Id.
125. Rule 412 prohibits the admission of all opinion and reputation evidence concerning a
rape victim's prior sexual behavior and allows evidence (other than by reputation or opinion)
of the victim's sexual history only under certain circumstances. FED. R. Evm. 412(a). The
evidence can be admitted if it is constitutionally required, if it is offered to show that someone
other than the defendant was the source of semen or injury, or if it involves past sexual
activity with the defendant offered to show consent. Id. 412(b). In addition, there are strict
procedural rules concerning how such evidence must be offered and how the determination of
its admissibility must be made. Id. 412(c).
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Prohibiting criminal defendants accused of rape from introducing evidence
available to defendants on trial for any other crime clearly implicates the
confrontation clause. 126 However, rape shield laws have withstood consti-
tutional scrutiny. 127 This can most readily be attributed to the fact that the
purpose of these laws-to protect the rape victim from "embarrassment
... and unwarranted public intrusion into her private life"'128 -is a suffi-
ciently important public policy to outweigh the sixth amendment rights that
may be violated by excluding evidence under such a law. Protecting these
victims from serious emotional distress caused by testifying in the presence
of their alleged rapists must, then, also be an important public policy. 129
C. Using Closed-Circuit Television to Protect the Adult Witness
Rape victims, like child sexual abuse victims, may have special needs
while they are involved with the criminal justice system,1 30 and states have
an interest in meeting these needs. The use of one-way closed-circuit
television to allow the victims to testify outside of the presence of the
defendant is one way in which states can protect victims from the emotional
distress of testifying. Therefore, when an individual rape victim would suffer
''serious emotional distress such that [she could not] reasonably
communicate" 3 ' if required to testify in the presence of her alleged rapist,
she should be permitted to testify over closed-circuit television because that
measure would be necessary to further the important public interest of
protecting rape victims testifying at trial. The use of this procedure in such
126. Tanford & Bocchino, supra note 119, at 545 (arguing that rape shield laws that single
out rape victims for special protection violate the sixth amendment).
127. See, e.g., Doe v. United States, 666 F.2d 43, 48 & n.9 (4th Cir. 1981).
128. 124 CONG. REc. 34,912 (1978) (statement of Rep. Mann); see also Michigan v. Lucas,
Ill S. Ct. 1743, 1746 (1991) (recognizing that a Michigan rape shield law "represents a valid
legislative determination that rape victims deserve heightened protection against surprise,
harassment, and unnecessary invasions of privacy").
129. The Supreme Court in Craig based its finding that protecting child abuse victims who
testify at trial is an important public policy largely on the fact that a "significant majority"
of states had statutes to protect child witnesses, the need for which was supported by a
"growing body of academic literature" on the matter. 110 S. Ct. at 3167-68. At least 45
states, as well as the federal government, have enacted rape shield laws to protect rape victims
who testify at trial. Tanford & Bocchino, supra note 119, at 551. In addition, the academic
literature on the psychological needs of rape victims is overwhelming. For bibliographies
including such literature, see S. KATZ & M. MAZUR, supra note 106, at 317-30; J. MACDONALD,
RAPE OFFENDERS AND THEIR VICTIMS 325-30 (1971); A. McEvoy & J. BROOKINGS, supra note
106, at 129-31; Fogarty, A Selective Bibliography, in FORCIBLE RAPE, supra note 107, at 373-
78.
130. The child victim's special need, obviously, comes from his or her age. The rape victim's
special need comes from the nature of the crime of rape. See supra notes 107-10 and
accompanying text.
131. That is, the level of emotional trauma required by the statute upheld in Craig. MD.
CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 9-102. For the text of this statute, see supra note 73.
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cases would also further the public interest of effectively prosecuting rapists
who may otherwise not be tried because of the victim's inability to testify. 132
Thus, a statute patterned after the one upheld in Craig, but designed to
protect adult rape victims as well as child sexual abuse victims, would meet
the standard for constitutionality established in Craig.
While closed-circuit television testimony by child witnesses is generally
governed by statute, in the absence of such an explicit statute, this procedure
would also be allowed under the unavailability exception to the hearsay
rule. If it is shown that the witness "will be traumatized by testifying at
trial or will offer useless testimony, then the witness is effectively unavail-
able."'3 Therefore, a rape victim who meets the standard of emotional
distress upheld in Craig-being effectively unable to testify in the presence
of the defendant-would be considered an unavailable witness, and the use
of closed-circuit television testimony could be admitted under the former
testimony exception to the hearsay rule. 3 4 Because this exception is a "firmly
rooted" hearsay exception, under Ohio v. Roberts3 ' the reliability of
evidence admitted under it is presumed. 3 6
The former testimony exception allows the admission of the testimony of
a witness who is unable to appear at trial when the testimony admitted was
subject to cross-examination by the person against whom the testimony is
offered (here, the defendant).'1 The defendant, through his attorney, is
able to fully cross-examine a witness testifying by closed-circuit television,
thus meeting this requirement. The Advisory Committee's Note to Federal
Rule 804(b)(1) states that former testimony is arguably "the strongest
hearsay" because "[t]he only missing one of the ideal conditions for the
giving of testimony is the presence of trier and opponent ('demeanor
evidence')."' 3 s Closed-circuit television testimony provides such "demeanor
evidence," making it even more ideal than testimony traditionally admitted
under the rule. In fact, the reliability of testimony by means of closed-
circuit television is second only to live testimony:
132. This was one of the purposes behind the Maryland statute upheld in Craig. Craig, 110
S. Ct. at 3168 (citation omitted).
133. Weissenberger, Federal Rule of Evidence 804: Admissible Hearsay from an Unavailable
Declarant, 55 U. CN. L. REv. 1079, 1087 (1987) (citation omitted).
134. FED. R. Evm. 804(b)(1); see supra note 7 for the text of this rule.
135. 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
136. See supra notes 26-32 and accompanying text for a discussion of Roberts.
137. FED. R. Evm. 804(b)(1). The rule also requires that the defendant had similar motive
to cross-examine the witness in the former proceeding. This is to avoid admitting testimony
that was technically subject to cross-examination but that the defendant did not adequately
cross-examine because, as a practical matter, there was no reason to do so at the time. Since
closed-circuit television is live and the testimony is thus not repeated from a former proceeding,
this danger is not present in such cases.
138. FED. R. EvrD. 804(b)(1) advisory committee's note.
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the presence of . . . oath, cross-examination, and observation of the
witness' demeanor ... adequately ensures that the testimony is both
reliable and subject to rigorous adversarial testing in a manner func-
tionally equivalent to that accorded live, in-person testimony.... Mhese
assurances of reliability and adversariness are far greater than those
required for admission of hearsay testimony under the Confrontation
Clause.'19
Thus, while the former testimony exception is generally used to admit
transcripts of testimony given by an unavailable witness in a former pro-
ceeding, the reasons behind the exception strongly suggest that closed-circuit
television testimony of an unavailable witness-be admitted as well. 14
However, no matter how reliable the use of closed-circuit television may
be, it still implicates the defendant's right to face-to-face confrontation and
thus can, and should, be used only when necessary. The confrontation
clause is based on the belief that "a face to face challenge influences
recollection, veracity, and communication, and that observing this confron-
tation will assist the trier of fact in determining credibility."1 4' Another
reason for requiring face-to-face confrontation is the belief that requiring
witnesses to face the person they are accusing will help reveal lying wit-
nesses.'42 Thus, the use of closed-circuit television testimony could increase
the possibility of false convictions. 43
This type of testimony may also be problematic because the video tech-
nique itself may affect the way in which the jury views the testimony of
the witness.'" The camera will determine what the jury sees and how it sees
it; for example, the witness may appear weaker and more credible than she
otherwise would, which would work against the defendant. 45 In addition,
139. Craig, 110 S. Ct. at 3166-67.
140. But see Graham, supra note 5, at 91. Professor Graham, writing before the Craig
decision, argues-without giving any reason-that the absence of face-to-face confrontation
prohibits the use of the former testimony exception to admit closed-circuit television testimony.
He instead suggests that it could be admitted under the residual exception, Federal Rule of
Evidence 804(b)(5), which requires that the testimony "possess particularized circumstantial
guarantees of trustworthiness equivalent to that possessed by hearsay statements that are
admissible under the traditional 'firmly rooted' hearsay exceptions." Id.
141. Graham, supra note 5, at 74.
142. See, e.g., supra notes 57, 63 and accompanying text.
143. However, it is possible that this is less likely to happen when rape is involved. See
supra note 119.
144. Graham, supra note 5, at 74-75.
145. One court described the problem in the following way:
[Tihere may be significant differences between testimony by closed-circuit tele-
vision and testimony face-to-face with the jury because of distortion and exclusion
of evidence .... Also, it is quite conceivable that the credibility of a witness
whose testimony is presented via close-circuit television may be enhanced by the
phenomenon called status-conferral; it is recognized that the media bestows
prestige and enhances the authority of an individual by legitimizing his status.
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•there is a risk that juries will view the use of television testimony as evidence
of the defendant's guilt, thus affecting the presumption of innocence.'"4
For these reasons, the standard for finding a witness unavailable to testify
because of emotional distress must be very high; the trauma the victim is
likely to suffer must be "substantially greater than the reaction of the
average victim of a rape."'' 47 In this way courts can insure that testimony
by means of closed-circuit television will be used only in those extraordinary
circumstances where testifying in the presence of the defendant would be
truly detrimental to the victim, not merely because she will find it difficult
to testify or be upset by having to relive the experience of being raped.
CONCLUSION
The escalating problem of child sexual abuse in this country has led to
the development of ways to meet the special needs of child witnesses. One
of these means, the use of closed-circuit television to allow the victim to
testify outside the presence of the defendant, can and should also be used
under some circumstances to protect rape victims from the trauma of facing
their alleged rapists in court. While the use of this procedure provides
reliable testimony, it also precludes the defendant's right to face-to-face
confrontation. Thus, while the use of this procedure can be very helpful to
rape victims, who traditionally find the trial process emotionally traumatiz-
ing, it should be used only when truly necessary to protect the victim from
serious psychological harm.
Such considerations are of particular importance when, as here, the demeanor
and credibility of the witness are crucial to the state's case.
Hochheiser v. Superior Court, 161 Cal. App. 3d 777, 786, 208 Cal. Rptr. 273, 278-79 (1984);
see also Armstrong, Comment, The Criminal Videotape Trial: Serious Constitutional Questions,
55 OR. L. REv. 567, 574-78 (1976).
146. "[The presentation of a witness' testimony via closed-circuit television may affect the
presumption of innocence by creating prejudice in the minds of the jurors towards the defendant
similar to that created by the use of physical restraints on a defendant in the jury's presence."
Hochheiser, 161 Cal. App. 3d at 787, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 279.
147. See Warren v. United States, 436 A.2d 821, 830 n.18 (D.C. 1981). The Supreme Court
in Craig declined to decide what the minimum constitutional standard for availability would
be, saying only that the standard of the Maryland statute was clearly sufficient and that the
emotional distress involved must be more than de minimis. See supra notes 90, 92-93 and
accompanying text.
In Warren, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals suggested the following factors should
be considered: "(1) the probability of psychological injury as a result of testifying, (2) the
degree of anticipated injury, (3) the expected duration of the injury, and (4) whether the
expected psychological injury is substantially greater than the reaction of the average victim
of a rape, kidnapping or terrorist act." 436 A.2d at 830 n.18.
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Eliminating Sex Discrimination in the Legal
Profession: The Key to Widespread Social Reform
SuzrANA BEX WILSON*
The purpose of this Note is to begin where other literature has ended.
That is, it will begin with a brief description of the origin and continuing
impact of sex discrimination and then propose a method for eliminating it
and the perceptions that perpetuate it. This Note argues that sex discrimi-
nation is rooted in the sexual division of labor and its accompanying gender
roles, both of which have become embedded in American society. Discrim-
ination may only be eliminated by fundamentally changing the attitudes
created by this division of labor. This process requires the efforts of all of
society, not just women. Full participation is appropriate by both sexes
because society as a whole will benefit from allowing women and men to
abandon their gender-conscious selves and pursue their own interests free
of unjust societal expectations.'
The initial effort to change society must come from the workplace,
specifically the legal profession. The "public sphere" is an appropriate
starting place for change because both men and women participate in it
while women are still the primary participants in the home or "private
sphere." Consequently, involving all of society in the effort to effect change
is more likely if that effort begins with the public sphere.
Beginning with the legal profession specifically is appropriate because it
is uniquely linked to all the segments constituting the public sphere-the
judiciary, the legislatures, and the business sector. The majority of judges
are lawyers, as are many legislators, and employers inevitably interact with
lawyers at some point in time. Thus, lawyers are capable of influencing all
segments of the public. This fact demonstrates why, on a practical level,
the legal profession should initiate the battle against discrimination. Ethical
considerations also support this proposal: the profession that represents
* J.D. Candidate, 1992, Indiana University School of Law at Bloomington; A.B., 1989,
Princeton University.
1. See generally L. KANowrrz, EQUAL RIGHTs: Tm MALE STAxE (1981) (explaining that
men will benefit if women are given equal rights because such rights are human rights that
benefit all individuals).
This Note does not address the differences that exist in the treatment of white women and
women of color, who suffer double discrimination. This is primarily due to the fact that the
literature and studies relied upon here fail to make that differentiation. This void in the
literature, as well as the void in understanding between white women and women of color, is
one that must be remedied so that equality among women may be achieved. One article
discussing the problems confronting African-American female attorneys is Burleigh, Black
Women Lawyers: Coping with Dual Discrimination, A.B.A. J., June 1, 1988, at 64.
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justice should not be guilty of treating individuals in an unfair and unlawful
manner. Ending sex discrimination within the legal profession will benefit
the profession by enabling it to truly represent itself as both an advocate
and a source of justice.
This Note anticipates the argument that either Congress, the judiciary,
or both are empowered to eliminate discrimination, making the placement
of such a burden upon the business sector inappropriate. As shall be
demonstrated, however, both Congress and the judiciary are limited in ways
that prevent them from effectively eliminating discriminatory attitudes prior
to any similar effort in the business sector.
This Note is divided into four parts. Part I discusses the origin of the
sexual division of labor and the impact of that division upon modem
society. Part II discusses the attempts of Congress to combat discrimination
and the limitations of that legislation. Part III analyzes the judiciary's
approach to discrimination cases and explains why that approach is incapable
of effecting widespread change. Finally, Part IV focuses on the business
sector as the appropriate vehicle for change and looks to the legal profession
to turn the key.
I. Tim CREATION AND CONTINUING IMPACT
OF PERCEIVED SEX DIFFERENCES
Eliminating sex discrimination requires developing an understanding of
its source. This section will discuss the development of the sexual division
of labor and its effects, which are primarily visible as gender roles, upon
American society. These roles, which fostered the perception of men and
women as unequal, are a consequence of the separation of private and
public. Although this dichotomy has eroded, notions of sexual inequality
persist. The final part of this section will discuss the manner in which
gender roles and sex discrimination affect the legal profession.
A. The Development and Current Understanding
of the Separation of Spheres
The separation of spheres occurred during the industrial revolution and
resulted in the notion that men should work in the public marketplace while
women, who remained in the private realm of the family, maintain their
homes and raise children. 2 Although this division virtually excluded women
from the workplace, the private sphere was touted as being as important
2. Olsen, The Family and the Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal Reform, 96 HARv.
L. REv. 1497, 1499 (1983). It should be noted that middle and upper class women remained
in the home while lower class women, who were also responsible for maintaining their homes,
generally left the home to work.
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as the public.3 Eventually, women were perceived as being naturally suited
for support roles.4 They were considered generous and nurturing and were
discouraged from being strong and self-reliant.5 Men were supposed to be
unemotional and completely devoted to their jobs. Any men who devoted
unusual amounts of time to their families were considered bizarre. 6
The "differences" between the sexes became widely accepted by the mid-
nineteenth century. In Bradwell v. Illinois,7 Justice Bradley stated:
[Tihe civil law, as well as nature herself, has always recognized a wide
difference in the respective spheres and destinies of man and woman.
Man is, or should be, woman's protector and defender. The natural and
proper timidity and delicacy which belongs to the female sex evidently
unfits it for many of the occupations of civil life....
... The paramount destiny and mission of woman are to fulfill the
noble and benign offices of wife and mother.8
This view persisted through the early twentieth century when, in Muller v.
Oregon,9 the Court upheld protective labor legislation directed toward
women'0 despite the fact that it had consistently held the same type of
legislation unconstitutional when applied to men.' The Court justified this
discrepancy by relying upon what it deemed to be the inherent differences
between the sexes and their different functions in life.' 2
Soon women began to realize that their sphere was regarded as inferior
to that of men. They began to agitate to expand their horizons, eventually
leaving their homes to enter the public sector. 13 This transition is best
symbolized by women's obtaining the right to vote, which recognized women
as full citizens and permitted their access to the public sphere at its most
fundamental level-government. Women also entered occupations previously
reserved for men, including medicine, academia, and law.' 4
The number of women in the work force increased dramatically during
World War II when women were called upon to replace the men who left
3. Id. at 1500. The ideal role for women was that of the devoted homemaker. K. GERSON,
HARD Cnoicas 4 (1985).
4. See Powers, Sex Segregation and the Ambivalent Directions of Sex Discrimination Law,
1979 Wis. L. R-v. 55, 95 (discussing the roles of women in terms of their being "surrogates").
5. Olsen, supra note 2, at 1500.
6. See Powers, supra note 4, at 95 (discussing the existence of occupational sanctions
against men who allowed "surrogate work" to interfere with their occupational (public) duties).
7. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1872).
8. Id. at 141 (Bradley, J., concurring). The Court upheld the state of Illinois' decision to
deny women the right to practice law. Id. at 139.
9. 208 U.S. 412 (1908).
10. Id. at 423; see also Powers, supra note 4, at 82 (discussing this decision).
11. See, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
12. Muller, 208 U.S. at 421-22.
13. See K. GERSON, supra note 3, at 5.
14. By 1930, the proportion of women in these professions reached highs not surpassed
until the 1970s. V. SAPmo, THE POLII.AL INTEORATION OF WOMEN 16 (1983).
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to fight overseas."s After the war, however, the sharp distinction between
public and private returned. This was primarily due to the fact that returning
veterans needed jobs and the women who had replaced them were perceived
as temporary workers.' 6 Women were forced out of the jobs they acquired
during the war and returned to their homemaking roles.
Fortunately, the 1960s and 1970s heralded a renewed effort to present
women with options other than performing their domestic roles. This effort
is symbolized by the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which forbids
discrimination against women in employment relations unless such discrim-
ination is a bona fide occupational qualification. 7
Although the status of women has changed, the public-private distinction
has not disappeared. Society continues to view the family as distinct from
the marketplace.' The institutionalization of perceived sex differences caused
by the separation of spheres still "permeates" American society. 19 Gender
roles now appear natural and are reinforced through the socialization
process.20 Female socialization emphasizes marriage and family, emotions,
charm, compliance, dependence, and deference. 2' Conversely, males are
encouraged to be aggressive, egotistic, persistent, and ambitious. 2 During
childhood both sexes experience "sex-role conditioning" by receiving mes-
sages labelling work as "masculine" or "feminine."' '
Some are beginning to recognize, however, that the separation of spheres
is an ideological construct with no relevance in modern society. 24 Many of
what were formerly considered to be biological differences between the sexes
are now recognized as being largely socially produced. 2 Studies have dem-
15. See K. GEESON, supra note 3, at 4.
16. See id. at 5. Because this setback occurred after women began to explore options
beyond the home and prior to the era of Betty Friedan's The Feminine Mystique (1963),
Gerson views the resurgent domesticity of the 1950s as more aberrant than typical. Id.
17. 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2 (1988).
18. See Olsen, supra note 2, at 1498.
19. S. OKiN, JUsTiCE, GENDER, AND THE FAMILY 6 (1989).
20. See id.
21. Taub, Keeping Women in Their Place: Stereotyping Per Se as a Form of Employment
Discrimination, 21 B.C.L. Rzv. 345, 356 (1980).
22. Id.
23. Schultz, Telling Stories About Women and Work: Judicial Interpretations of Sex
Segregation in the Workplace in Title VII Cases Raising the Lack of Interest Approach, 103
HARv. L. REv. 1750, 1817 (1990).
24. S. OiN, supra note 19, at 23; see Powers, supra note 4, at 70 (noting that women's
entering the marketplace undermines the rationale-women's alleged physical and emotional
inability to participate in that arena-for their prior and continued separate treatment).
25. S. OmuN, supra note 19, at 6 (noting that although explanations of the subordination
of women range from focusing on biological differences as causal to totally abandoning
biological differences as a factor most feminist scholars currently reject biological determinism
and emphasize gender as a purely social construct). Those who perceive the qualities approved
in women today as women's "nature" refuse to acknowledge that women have been produced
and shaped by a society in which males have always been dominant. S. OKrI, WomEN IN
WEsTERN PoLmcAL THOUOHT 297 (1979). No one will know what women's true nature is like
until the sexes are able to develop in a society where they receive equal treatment. Id.
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onstrated that there is no consensus concerning the extent of the "innate"
differences between the sexes, the appropriate roles for the sexes, or which
family forms and division of labor, if any, are most beneficial for all
involved. 6 In fact, girls receive ambiguous signals that encourage them to
engage in both "masculine" and "feminine" activities. 27 This indicates that
sex-role socialization is not so confining that women are relegated only to
"feminine" tasks 3
Additionally, the social constructs that ordinarily affect women's choices
are changing, restructuring the alternatives open to them.29 Women are
beginning to actively shape their lives.30 Even if young women aspire to
"feminine" work initially, those aspirations are likely to change substantially
after they begin working.31 Women's current social environment encourages
professional as well as domestic aspirations, and those women who feel
ambivalent about motherhood are less likely to ignore their misgivings. 32
B. The Impact of the Separation of Spheres
on the Business Sector
The roles created by the separation of public and private have influenced
the business sector, making women's complete entry into the work force
difficult.3 3 Women are not permitted to ignore their assigned gender roles,
creating tension between their personal and public lives. 34 Employers have
not eliminated this tension for two reasons. First, they do not realize that
gender bias affects all aspects of the employment process to such an extent
that women, as women, are not allowed to succeed. Second, employers
26. S. OJUN, supra note 19, at 172.
27. Schultz, supra note 23, at 1821.
28. Id.
29. K. GERSON, supra note 3, at 213. Gerson conducted a study of women between the
ages of 27 and 37 from a wide variety of working- and middle-class occupations who were
also full-time homemakers, working mothers, or childless workers. Id. at 41. The sample
included single, divorced, and married women. Id. In her final analysis, Gerson concluded
that "notions of 'feminine personality' do not do justice to the complexity and variety of
women's orientations toward mothering and work." Id. at 213.
30. See id. (describing women's life decisions as being the product of a negotiation process
where they confront and respond to constraints and opportunities).
31. Schultz, supra note 23, at 1817.
32. K. GERSON, supra note 3, at 17. Gerson notes that personal independence and com-
mitments outside the home will continue to take on greater significance in women's lives. Id.
at 214.
33. See Kaye, Women Lawyers in Big Firms: A Study in Progress Toward Gender Equality,
57 FORDH.AM L. Rzv. 111, 116 (1988) (stating that this lack of advancement is due to societal
attitudes and inequalities).
34. See Becker, Barriers Facing Women in the Wage-Labor Market and the Need for
Additional Remedies: A Reply to Fischel and Lazear, 53 U. Cm. L. Rav. 934, 941 (1986)
(noting that women face considerable tension between their chosen jobs and their assigned
gender identities).
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have failed to recognize that women retain primary responsibility for child
care and other domestic duties.
1. Gender Bias in the Employment Process
Studies conducted during the past two decades indicate that gender
stereotypes in the workplace remain firmly entrenched despite the advances
made by women. One group of studies has found that women are perceived
as less capable and intelligent than men. Participants in a study conducted
in 1974 considered men to be more skillful when performing either masculine
or feminine tasks, and male performance was attributed to intelligence while
women performing well at the same tasks were credited with luck5.3 These
results were true for both female and male observers. 6 Another study found
that professional articles were rated higher when attributed to male rather
than female authors, and another found that a highly competent woman's
accomplishments must be exceptional for her to be recognized for her
work. 7 A 1985 study found that although men in traditionally female
occupations received the lowest ratings of male workers they were still rated
higher than women in traditionally male occupations. 3 These studies indicate
that both sexes perceive women as less intelligent and capable than men.
Gender bias has also been shown to enter hiring and promotion decisions.
Studies attempting to simulate the hiring process have found that male
applicants for managerial positions are more highly rated and are accepted
more frequently than equally qualified females.39 The research suggests that
the perceived sex orientation of the position influenced the hiring decision. 40
Other studies have demonstrated that applicants for any position are eval-
uated most favorably if the position is considered appropriate for their
gender. 41
One study revealed that men are preferred in discriminatory work envi-
ronments while the sexes are evaluated equally in egalitarian climates. 42
35. Deaux & Emswiller, Explanations of Successful Performance on Sex-Linked Tasks:
What Is Skill for the Male Is Luck for the Female, 29 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOLOGY
80, 84 (1974).
36. Id.
37. See Taub, supra note 21, at 353.
38. See Jacobs & Powell, Occupational Prestige: A Sex-Neutral Concept?, 12 SEx RoL.s
1061, 1069 (1985).
39. Taub, supra note 21, at 354.
40. Id.
41. Radford, Sex Stereotyping and the Promotion of Women to Positions of Power, 41
HAsTINGS L.J. 471, 492 (1990).
42. Katz, Sex Discrimination in Hiring: The Influence of Organizational Climate and Need
for Approval on Decision Making Behavior, 11 PSYCHOLOGY OF WOMEN Q. 11, 17 (1987).
Katz's subjects were 161 male undergraduate and graduate students in business classes at a
northeastern university. Id. at 13. They were told to behave as if they were managers in a
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These results suggest that managers attempt to match the attributes of
potential employees with what are perceived to be the important attributes
of the organization. 4
Job performance evaluations are also susceptible to gender bias. In groups
of equally qualified women and men, women consistently receive lower
ratings." Equally qualified women are less likely to be promoted, offered
training opportunities, and respected in their evaluations of other employ-
ees. 41 These findings may be due to the fact that the characteristics of the
majority are preferred, so male traits, and consequently males, are favored. 46
Managerial positions are still viewed as being reserved for males because
they are thought to require "male" traits such as aggressiveness and
competitiveness. 47 The same male managers adhering to these views have
stated, however, that women are as capable as men.48
The bias against women is largely due to their "token" status in high-
level positions. Because women in executive positions are a definite minority,
they are under much more pressure than men to perform well.49 In such
situations the differences between the tokens, women, and the majority,
men, tend to be exaggerated by the majority so it will be able to preserve
its identity.50 This causes the tokens to be isolated. Because they are viewed
as different from, and exceptions to, the corporate culture, women with
token status have little hope of changing the corporate culture. 5'
In a system that rewards individuals based upon their ability to operate
well within it, the token status of women makes their advancement difficult. 52
Currently, women who are attempting to attain executive positions can only
do so by adhering to the current structure, which requires them to imitate
men. These women then become part of the majority and, if they succeed
in absorbing and mimicking the culture of the majority, are not necessarily
manufacturing company making a personnel decision. Id. at 14. They reviewed one of two
versions of three different documents; one version created a discriminatory environment while
the other was egalitarian. Id. After reading the materials, which consisted of a memo from a
vice president, an article from a company newspaper, and an organizational chart, subjects
reviewed the job description and an application that was either from a female or male
applicant. Id.
43. Id. at 17-18. This phenomenon is due to the fact that an individual's expectation of
future interaction with a group and degree of acceptance within that group affect the subject's
willingness to conform to the group's expectations. Id. at 17.
44. See, e.g., Becker, supra note 34, at 942; Katz, supra note 42, at 11; Liefland, Career
Patterns of Male and Female Lawyers, 35 BuFF. L. REV. 601, 610 (1986).
45. Taub, supra note 21, at 354.
46. Katz, supra note 42, at 12.
47. Taub, supra note.21, at 356.
48. Id.
49. R. KANTER, MEN AND WOMEN OF THE CORPORTON 212 (1977).
50. Id. at 210-11; Taub, supra note 21, at 358.
51. See R. KANTER, supra note 49, at 208-09; Taub, supra note 21, at 359.
52. Powers, supra note 4, at 91.
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considered part of the token group. Completely adopting the characteristics
of the majority is not necessarily seen as a positive attribute, however:
Women who achieve great success may be perceived as "'macho' or as
needing to "walk more femininely, talk more femininely, dress more fem-
ininely. ' 53 Thus, women are placed in a no-win situation. Successful women
are pressured to ignore those women who do not succumb to the culture
of the majority.54 Women who are not successful merely reinforce the
majority's perception of successful tokens as an exception.55 Thus, successful
women may be used to reinforce the notion that most women are less
capable than men and legitimate the current hierarchical structure of the
workplace.56
The pressure on successful women to ignore those who are unsuccessful
prevents them from promoting others like themselves.? Consequently, women
as a group become stratified. This result will persist unless some form of
outside intervention breaks the self-perpetuating cycle of tokenism.5" Some
have argued that, as more women enter the workplace, the mere increase
in their numbers will solve the problems created by tokenism. 9 Relying
upon a "strength in numbers" approach, however, necessarily depends upon
women's being promoted into positions where they will be the individuals
responsible for hiring and promoting others.60 Assuming that this will happen
simply because women become increasingly visible ignores the fact that
those currently making personnel decisions tend to hire and promote those
like themselves: a man will hire men. 61 As a 1988 report on women in the
legal profession noted, "The statistics ... dispel any sense of complacency
that the sheer numbers of women entering the profession will eliminate
53. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 109 S. Ct. 1775, 1782 (1989).
54. R. KANTER, supra note 49, at 241.
55. See id. at 241-42.
56. See Powers, supra note 4, at 92.
57. Id.
58. R. KANTER, supra note 49, at 241.
59. See id. at 238; Olsen, supra note 2, at 1549-50 & n.201; Powers, supra note 4, at 93;
Rhode, Perspectives on Professional Women, 40 STAN. L. REy: 1163, 1207 (1988).
60. A study of the hiring and retention practices of American law schools supports the
notion that the presence of women in decision-making positions results in the promotion of
more women:
At schools with higher proportions of tenured women, untenured women were
denied tenure much less frequently, left at lower rates, and were granted tenure
at higher rates than men. At schools with lower proportions of tenured women,
the untenured women were denied tenure much more frequently, left at higher
rates, and were granted tenure at lower rates than men.
Chused, The Hiring and Retention of Minorities and Women on American Law School
Faculties, 137 U. PA. L. Rav. 537, 552 (1988). The study also found that tenure may be a
serious problem for women working at the more prestigious law schools. Id.
61. See Becker, supra note 34, at 945. This fact has made it difficult for women to acquire
mentors because those relationships, too, tend to develop between individuals who are similar.
Id.
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barriers to their advancement." 62 Despite the number of women entering
the legal profession, they are not advancing at rates commensurate with
their male colleagues. 63
These findings indicate that an increase in sheer numbers is not enough
alone to eliminate discrimination. Therefore, unless those individuals making
personnel decisions are forced to change their gender-biased approach, the
current system will continue. Women who are currently in high-level posi-
tions must also change their attitudes. They should no longer succumb to
pressure to conform to the status quo. Instead, they should forge ahead on
their own to develop a more just and less gender-biased approach to
management and promotion.
2. The Effect of Private Responsibilities
on Women's Public Lives
Women are expected to perform their traditional domestic roles in addition
to their newly acquired professional ones.64 Requiring women to fulfill these
often conflicting roles places them at a disadvantage in the business sector,
where "success" is equated with total dedication to a career.
For the most part, the business sector has not attempted to resolve this
conflict. Employers continue to expect their workers to be as dedicated to
their careers as they were in the past. 65 Part-time work is often viewed as
indicative of partial commitment and inconsistent with high-quality job
performance." Many jobs are still structured as if workers have no family
responsibilities. 67 Consequently, women are hampered by two conflicting
perceptions: that women are primarily responsible for child rearing and that
committed members of the workforce lack such responsibilities. 6
This conflict places women at a disadvantage when compared to their
male colleagues, who generally have fewer or less time-consuming domestic
responsibilities than women. 69 Because women have less time to devote to
their careers, the workplace is stratified, with women on the bottom.70 In
62. ABA Commission on Women in the Profession, Report to the House of Delegates 7
(approved Aug. 10, 1988) [hereinafter ABA Report].
63. See infra notes 72-76 and accompanying text.
64. See, e.g., Frug, Securing Job Equality for Women: Labor Market Hostility to Working
Mothers, 59 B.U.L. Rav. 55, 56 (1979); Liefland, supra note 44, at 614; Olsen, supra note 2,
at 1565.
65. See Frug, supra note 64, at 56.
66. Rhode, supra note 59, at 1186.
67. See ABA Report, supra note 62, at 14; Holmes, Structural Causes of Dissatisfaction
Among Large-Firm Attorneys: A Feminist Perspective, 12 WomE's RTs. L. REP. 9, 19 (1990);
Olsen, supra note 2, at 1547.
68. S. OKiN, supra note 19, at 5.
69. Powers, supra note 4, at 105-06.
70. See S. Ozcm, supra note 19, at 5.
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fact, more than sixty percent of the women in the work force are in low-
paying clerical and sales jobs.71
C. Sex Discrimination in the Legal Profession
Like the rest of the workplace, the legal profession is stratified by sex,
with women on the bottom. In 1988 the American Bar Association Com-
mission on Women in the Profession issued a report recognizing the existence
of this problem within the legal profession:
The statistics demonstrate that women are not rising to "upper" levels
of the profession in appropriate numbers .... Indeed, witnesses ob-
served that women often reach a level above which they seem unable to
rise....
For the few women who do "make it" beyond the "glass ceiling,"
the consequences are often a lack of support networks .... These
women partners or judges are not regarded as just partners or judges,
but as women partners and judges .... In addition, . . . women who
"made it," often did so at the great expense of not having a spouse
and children.-
The conclusions of the ABA report are supported by recent statistics
concerning the status of women in the profession. A survey of the nation's
250 largest law firms found that women constituted approximately 40% of
the associates hired in 1986 and 1987 and represented nearly one third of
the nation's total associates. 73 Despite these statistics, less than 8% of the
nation's partners are women,74 a proportion that increases by a mere 1%
each year. 7s Female and male lawyers also differ in their career patterns:
more women than men are still found in the least lucrative areas of the
law-state and local government, public interest, and nontenured academic
71. Saltzman, Trouble at the Top, U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., June 17, 1991, at 40, 42.
72. ABA Report, supra note 62, at 7 (emphasis in original). The Commission was established
to pursue two principles: (1) women are entitled to full participation in the legal profession;
and (2) all lawyers must work to eliminate barriers so women may participate fully. Barnett,
Women Practicing Law: Changes in Attitudes, Changes in Platitudes, 42 FiA. L. REv. 209,
213 (1990). Most of the Commission's evidence and findings were the result of hearings where
practitioners and students testified concerning their personal experiences in the profession.
Women in other professions are also encountering glass ceilings. A Department of Labor
survey of nine major corporations concluded that women's advancement in the workplace is
blocked by subtle discrimination. Saltzman, supra note 71, at 41.
73. Goldstein, Women in the Law Aren't Yet Equal Partners, N.Y. Times, Feb. 12, 1988,
at B7, col. 5 (citing a study by the National Law Journal).
74. Id.
75. ABA Report, supra note 62, at 5. Women's status in the remainder of the workplace
is similar: only 3% of the top executives at the largest American companies are women.
Saltzman, supra note 71, at 41. This figure has changed little in 10 years. Id.
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positions-and private practice in large firms is the only area that attracts
approximately equal proportions of men and women.76
The ABA study found that, although many male attorneys accept women's
integration into the profession and a smaller number are guilty of discrim-
ination, most female attorneys perceive gender discrimination as a serious
problem. 7 Female attorneys have been denied promotions and job oppor-
tunities for rejecting sexual advances.78 Some clients still insist upon working
only with male attorneys, and a few firms still acquiesce in such demands. 79
Female lawyers are also discriminated against in terms of salary. The
Department of Labor recently found that female lawyers and judges earn,
on average, seventy percent of what males earn in the same positions s0
This difference may be due to the fact that women have difficulty "rain-
making," that is, acquiring new clients for their firms.8" It may also be
caused by the fact that women achieve partner status at lower rates than
men.
82
76. ABA Report, supra note 62, at 5; Holmes, supra note 67, at 11. Areas of concentration
within the profession by sex are as follows:
Females(070) Males(%)
Private Firm 56 69
Large Firm 16.5 17.2
Government 17 9
Legal Aid 5 1
Id. at 11, 28; see also J. ABawsoN & B. FRANKLIN, WHERE THEY ARE Now: THE STORY OF
an WoMN oF HARvARD LAW 1974 (1986); C. EPsTEN, WOMEN IN LAW 98 (1983); Jack &
Jack, Women Lawyers: Archetype and Alternatives, in MAPPING Tm MORAL Dom- N 263 (C.
Gilligan, J. Ward & J. Taylor eds. 1988) (study of eighteen female and eighteen male attorneys
to determine differences in moral choices and conflicts in the practice of law); Liefland, supra
note 44, at 604-07 (study of graduates of University of Pennsylvania, Berkeley, Columbia,
and New York University law schools); Special Project, Gender, Legal Education, and the
Legal Profession: An Empirical Study of Stanford Law Students and Graduates, 40 STAN. L.
REv. 1209 (1988).
Women are underrepresented on law school faculties as a whole: a survey of law professors
revealed that less than 12% of the faculty at several top law schools were women. Goldstein,
supra note 73.
Women may be more likely to work in areas such as government or public interest because
those areas combine factors that appeal to many women, such as fulfilling a sense of mission,
providing regular work hours, and fostering a more egalitarian office culture due to less
competition and hierarchy. C. EPs'EN, supra, at 129. These areas may also provide the
structure and predictable work hours essential to mother-lawyers whose spouses do not assume
equal responsibility for child care. Holmes, supra note 67, at 28.
77. Barnett, supra note 72, at 215.
78. Id. at 214 (discussing Broderick v. Ruder, 685 F. Supp. 1269 (D.D.C. 1988)). Such
conduct usually goes unreported, making victims unaware of the pervasiveness of the problem.
Id.
79. Id. at 216.
80. Saltzman, supra note 71, at 40. Women in the workplace as a whole earn 72076 of
what males earn in similar positions. Id. at 42.
81. Barnett, supra note 72, at 217; see also Holmes, supra note 67, at 23 (stating that lack
of "old girls" network makes generating business difficult).
82. Holmes, supra note 67, at 19.
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The national bar is not the only group to have examined sex discrimination
in the profession: state and local bar associations have also been conducting
surveys to examine the various forms of sex discrimination. 3 These studies
have found that women lawyers are relegated to certain types of work, such
as probate and matrimonial law,84 and receive less favorable work evalua-
tions than men."5 They must work longer and harder to be able to compete
on equal terms with men and have difficulty acquiring mentors. 6 Women
are also excluded from the social activities of their firms, made conscious
of their appearance, and made to feel isolated.1
7
The lifestyles of male and female attorneys also differ significantly. First,
women continue to be primarily responsible for child care and other domestic
duties.8 8 Second, approximately ninety-three percent of married female at-
torneys have spouses who work full time, while forty-eight percent of
married male attorneys have spouses who do not work outside the home. 9
Female lawyers are more likely to be married to "high status professionals"
than are male lawyers. 90 Consequently, female attorneys cannot rely upon
their spouses to respond to domestic crises. In contrast, many male lawyers
have spouses who are capable of relieving them of domestic responsibilities,
giving them more time to devote to their careers. This difference is especially
apparent and disadvantageous to women during the years immediately
preceding the partnership decision, which are the most demanding profes-
sionally and typically coincide with childbearing years. 9' By adhering to a
system that uses time devoted to work as the definition of success, the
profession ensures that men will advance faster than women, thereby per-
petuating gender inequality.
The preceding discussion suggests that gender bias within the profession
exists in two forms: (1) perceptions that female attorneys are different from
83. Frank, Law Firm Sex Bias, A.B.A. J., July, 1985, at 25 (discussing studies in Los
Angeles, Hawaii, Michigan, Maryland, and Minnesota); see Gellis, Great Expectations: Women
in the Legal Profession, A Commentary on State Studies, 66 IND. L.J. 941 (1991) (reporting
results of a recent study in Indiana). These studies started in reaction to the Supreme Court's
decision in Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69 (1984), and consist primarily of surveys
sent to both male and female members of state and local bar associations. For further
explanation of Hishon, see infra notes 148-49 and accompanying text.
84. C. EPsTEIN, supra note 76, at 110.
85. Liefland, supra note 44, at 609.
86. Jack & Jack, supra note 76, at 267; Liefland, supra note 44, at 609; see Barnett, supra
note 72, at 216.
87. Liefland, supra note 44, at 611.
88. ABA Report, supra note 62, at 14.
89. Holmes, supra note 67, at 21 (discussing findings of 1983 ABA survey).
90. Liefland, supra note 44, at 614.
91. See Rhode, supra note 59, at 1186 (noting that the partnership decision is made at a
time when women's domestic demands are most intense); see also Kaye, supra note 33, at 122
(noting that this problem is not unique to the legal profession). The average attorney works
at least one workday per week more than the average American worker. Holmes, supra note
67, at 14.
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and, therefore, inferior to their male counterparts and (2) the system of
gauging success by the number of hours devoted to the profession. Both of
these forms of bias require women to adhere to the male model of the
profession or be rejected. They also hamper women because women's
continuing domestic responsibilities limit the time they can devote to their
professional lives while men are not similarly affected. A simplistic and
somewhat short-sighted solution to these problems would be to divide
domestic responsibilities between the sexes. Although this approach would
remove the responsibility for child care and other private duties from women
and divide them between the sexes, requiring both sexes to perform the
same balancing act that women are currently attempting is unreasonable. A
more acceptable solution would be to change the status quo in terms of
both behavior and attitudes. The profession should recognize and accom-
modate the outside interests of its members by eliminating "time spent" as
a definition of success and allowing all attorneys to devote more time to
their personal lives. Doing so would erase the distinction between public
and private and end the notion that the private is inferior to, and can be
sacrificed for the benefit of, the public. Consequently, the notion of
"feminine" roles as inferior and "masculine" roles as superior would
disappear, to be replaced by "human" responsibilities that are shared by
all. 92 The remainder of this Note is devoted to discussing the best manner
in which to implement these changes.
II. CONGRESS'S LIMITED ABILITY TO ELIMINATE DIsCRUMNATION
Some may view Congress as the body best equipped to eliminate discrim-
ination and improve the workplace. 93 Congress does indeed have the power
to pass laws combatting discrimination and install policies that would
provide workers with more personal time. This ability is demonstrated by
Congress's passing Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 94 the Pregnancy
Discrimination Act of 1978, 95 and the Fair Labor Standards Act. 96 Despite
92. But see Saltzman, supra note 71, at 44 (discussing the neofeminist view that, true
equality is achieved only if the differences between men and women are valued equally).
93. See generally Frug, supra note 64, at 61 (suggesting that, because litigation is unlikely
to achieve the labor market restructuring necessary to eliminate the disparities between men
and women in the work force, new legislation may be necessarj to ensure full job equality
for working mothers).
94. Pub. L. No. 88-352, §§ 701-716, 78 Stat. 241, 253-66 (current version at 42 U.S.C. §
2000e to 2000e-17 (1988)).
95. Pub. L. No. 95-555, § 701(k), 92 Stat. 2076, 2077 (current version at 42 U.S.C. §
2000e(k) (1988)).
96. Ch. 376, 52 Stat. 1060 (1938) (current version at 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1988 & Supp.
1 1989)). The Fair Labor Standards Act significantly altered the workplace by establishing a
minimum wage and maximum work hours for employees of businesses engaged in interstate
commerce.
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these past measures, the ability of Congress to enact similar antidiscrimi-
nation legislation is severely limited by the pressure imposed by the business
sector and the veto power of the President, as is demonstrated by the
history of the Family and Medical Leave Act97 and the Civil Rights Act of
1991.9 8 Also, even if Congress were to pass appropriate antidiscrimination
legislation, such action would only affect the behavior of individuals, not
their attitudes. Because attitudes are what must be changed, legislation is
an inappropriate means for attaining that end.
Title VII is an example of the manner in which Congress has the ability
to help eliminate discrimination. The provision states:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise
to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such indivi-
dual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin .... 99
A plaintiff may have a cause of action if she is denied employment or a
term, condition, or privilege of employment for illegitimate reasons.-°
Employers may hire employees on the basis of their religion, sex, or national
origin if those characteristics are "bona fide occupational qualification[s]
reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that particular business or
enterprise."' 0'° Title VII does not require employers to give preferential
treatment to individuals whose race, sex, religion, or national origin is
underrepresented in the employer's work force.'0
Title VII also created the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC), which is responsible for pursuing employment discrimination
claims. 03 The EEOC may bring civil actions against employers who fail to
enter into conciliation agreements.1 4 If the EEOC dismisses a charge or
fails to file a civil action or enter a conciliation agreement within 180 days
from the date the charge is filed, the aggrieved individual may initiate a
civil action.105 Actions brought under Title VII are under the jurisdiction of
the federal courts.10 The available remedies include enjoining the employer
from engaging in the unlawful employment practice with which it is charged,
97. H.R. 2, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
98. Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat 1071.
99. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1988).
100. Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 78 (1984).
101. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e).
102. Id. § 2000e-20).
103. Id. § 2000e-4.
104. Id. § 2000e-5(f)(1).
105. Id.
106. Id. § 2000e-5(f)(3).
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ordering the reinstatement or hiring of employees, with or without back
pay, 1°7 and compensatory and punitive damages. 08
Congress expanded the protection afforded women under Title VII by
passing the Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA)."' 9 The Act is a definitional
amendment to Title VII that states:
The terms "because of sex" or "on the basis of sex" include, but are
not limited to, because of or on the basis of pregnancy,- childbirth, or
related medical conditions; and women affected by pregnancy, childbirth,
or related medical conditions shall be treated the same for all employ-
ment-related purposes ... as other persons not so affected but similar
in their ability or inability to work .... 110
The effect of the PDA is to prohibit both employment deprivation resulting
from pregnancy and employment policies adversely affecting pregnant work-
ers."' On its face the Act only applies to the period of physical disability
accompanying childbirth. It serves to equalize the employment opportunities
available to both sexes by ensuring that, in situations where an employer
provides disability leave, women do not suffer by virtue of the fact that
they alone bear children." 2
Although the PDA provides women with some protection against discrim-
ination based upon pregnancy, the scope of the Act is limited. The PDA
is not the equivalent of a national policy requiring job-protected maternity
leave."' Instead, it only provides protection in situations where employers
already provide general disability leave and does not include leaves that are
more related to child rearing than to childbearing.14 Some have argued that
the Act offers no protection to women whose employers allow no disability
leave and that women are not guaranteed they will be able to return to
107. Id. § 2000e-5(g).
108. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 102(b), 105 Stat. 1071 (1991). The
amount of compensatory and punitive damages that may be recovered is limited. Id. Punitive
damages may only be recovered if any employer engages in discriminatory practices with
"malice or with reckless indifference to the federally protected rights of an aggrieved indi-
vidual." Id.
109. Id. § 2000e(k).
110. Id.
111. Jacobson, Note, Pregnancy and Employment, 68 B.U.L. Rnv. 1019, 1025 (1988).
112. Id. at 1033.
113. The United States is the only advanced industrial country without a national pregnancy
policy. Z. EISENSTEIN, Ta FEmrAL BODY AND THE LAW 213 (1988). Most industrial nations
have paid maternity leaves and health insurance benefits covering a minimum of three months.
Id. In 127 countries with national pregnancy legislation, the average length of maternity leave
is 12-14 weeks. Id. In addition to paid maternity leaves, most countries also provide unpaid
job-protected leaves for one to two years. Id. In Sweden, fathers or mothers are entitled to a
180 day leave at 90% of salary after the birth of a child, and either has the option to remain
on leave an additional 180 days. Id. at 214. Sweden is also debating whether to shorten work
hours nationally so parents will have more time with their children. Frug, supra note 64, at
100.
114. Jacobson, supra note 111, at 1026.
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their jobs after taking any leave beyond that necessary to recover from
pregnancy and birth."l5 These potential gaps in the scope of the Act ensure
that some inequality between the sexes will continue: "A female employee
subject to an inadequate leave policy must choose between exercising a
fundamental right and keeping her job. This is a choice that no male
employee is forced to make.""l 16 Women, without being protected from
"arbitrary job interruptions and resulting wage loss due to pregnancy[] ...
will constantly have less job tenure an& be paid lower wages than a man
who started in a similar position at the same time. ' 1  Fortunately, some
state legislatures have resolved the ambiguities of the PDA by enacting
legislation requiring employers to provide job-protected pregnancy disability
leave." 8
Although the enactment of Title VII and the PDA reveal that Congress
can and will act to end discrimination, recent developments demonstrate
that Congress's willingness and ability to perform such acts are not infallible.
Two different sources impose limitations upon Congress: the veto power of
the President and the attitudes of the members of Congress and their
business sector constituents. These limitations are best illustrated by recent
attempts to enact the Family and Medical Leave Act"9 and the Civil Rights
Act of 1991.120
The Family and Medical Leave Act would, in part, create a national
parental leave policy. The Act is a natural extension of the PDA and state
pregnancy disability leave legislation.' 2' In the findings supporting the Act,
Congress stated:
(2) it is important to the development of the child and to the family
unit that fathers and mothers be able to participate in early childrearing
(5) due to the nature of women's and men's roles in our society, the
primary responsibility for family caretaking often falls on women, and
115. See Brief of Coalition for Reproductive Equality in the Workplace for Respondents at
14, California Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272 (1987) (No. 85-494); Brief of
California Women Lawyers; Child Care Law Centers; Jessica McDowell; Lawyers Committee
for Urban Affairs; Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational Fund; Women Lawyers'
Association of Los Angeles; and Women Lawyers at Sacramento, for Respondents at 12, Cal.
Fed., 479 U.S. 272 [hereinafter Brief of California Women Lawyers].
116. Brief of Coalition for Reproductive Equality in the Workplace for Respondents, supra
note 115, at 14.
117. Brief of California Women Lawyers, supra note 115, at 12.
118. Jacobson, supra note 111, at 1026. See generally Cal. Fed., 479 U.S. 272 (discussing
such a statute enacted in California). In Cal. Fed., the Court held that state legislatures could
enact such pregnancy disability leave statutes and that such statutes would survive gender
discrimination claims brought by males. Id. at 292.
119. H.R. 1, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
120. Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071.
121. Jacobson, supra note 111, at 1043.
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such responsibility affects their working lives more than it affects the
working lives of men; and
(6) employment standards that apply to one gender only have serious
potential for encouraging employers to discriminate against employees
and applicants for employment who are of that gender.'"
The Act's purpose is to balance the demands of the workplace with the
needs of families and
(4) to accomplish such purposes in a manner which, consistent with the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, minimizes the
potential for discrimination on the basis of sex by ensuring generally
that leave is available for eligible medical reasons (including maternity-
related disability) and for compelling family reasons, on a gender-neutral
basis; and
(5) to promote the goal of equal employment opportunity for women
and men, pursuant to such clause.'13
As proposed initially, the Act would require businesses with more than fifty
employees '24 to grant workers a total of twelve weeks unpaid leave during
any twelve-month period after the birth or adoption of a child.' 25 The
worker's entitlement to the leave terminates one year after the birth or
adoption. 126 Both parents may not take leave at the same time.' 27 Ninety-
five percent of the country's employers and approximately fifty percent of
all employees would be excluded from the provision.'2 A compromise bill,
proposed by Senators Christopher S. Bond and Christopher J. Dodd in
September, 1991, would allow employers to exempt key employees, meaning
the highest paid ten percent of the workforce. 29 The proposal also reduces
the sanctions to be imposed on employers who do not reinstate workers
returning from leave. 30 The bill passed in the Senate by an overwhelming
majority.' The House also passed similar legislation, but the bill did not
receive enough votes to override a Presidential veto.3 2
Supporters of the Act, which include women's groups and labor organi-
zations,' claim that employers will benefit from such a provision because
122. H.R. 2, § 2(a).
123. Id. § 2(b).
124. Id. § 101(5)(A).
125. Id. § 102.
126. Id. § 102(2)(A).
127. Id.
128. Senators Offer Compromise on Unpaid Leave, N.Y. Times, Sept. 19, 1991, at A23,
col. 1.
129. Id.
130. L.A. Times, Sept. 19, 1991, at A31, col. 1. This aspect of the proposal parallels the
Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219, which provides for double damages and
administrative hearings. Id.
131. Gugliotta, Family Leave Passes the House, But Not by Veto-Proof Majority, Wash.
Post, Nov. 14, 1991, at A33, col. 1.
132. Id.
133. Holmes, Bush Vetoes Bill on Family Leave, N.Y. Times, June 30, 1990, at 9, col. 5.
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their employees will become nfore productive. 3 4 Further, the Act represents
a national affirmation of the fact that the family lives of employees are
important and must be recognized in the workplace.
Businesses oppose the Act "as an onerous requirement that would force
employers to hire expensive replacement workers and expose the employers
to potential litigation."' 35 This opposition stems primarily from the percep-
tion that the Act would impose unwarranted costs and inflexibility upon
the employers involved.3 6 The Bush administration has sided with employers
and "believes that leave policies should be negotiated between employers
and employees or as part of collective bargaining agreements."'31 7 President
Bush has vowed to veto "any measure that mandates leave."' 38
Congress recently enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1991, which is meant
to "respond to recent Supreme Court decisions by restoring the civil rights
protections that were dramatically limited by those decisions" and "to
strengthen existing protections and remedies available under federal civil
rights laws."' 13 9 The Act accomplishes these purposes by either overruling
or modifying some Supreme Court decisions of the past decade. 4 For
example, it reaffirms that relying upon prejudice in any way when making
an employment decision violates Title VII.' 4' The Act allows victims of
intentional gender discrimination to recover compensatory damages in the
same manner as members of minority groups and punitive damages in cases
of egregious discrimination; the amounts recoverable as punitive damages
for sex discrimination are limited. 42 Although this measure was once op-
posed by President Bush, 14 he signed a compromise version on November
21, 1991.44 His change in attitude appears to be an attempt to distance the
Republican Party from the politics of former Ku Klux Klan leader David
Duke and to gain public support.145
Enacting legislation such as the Civil Rights Act of 1991 and the Family
and Medical Leave Act clearly depends upon whether Congress is able to
garner enough support to override the President's veto and the political
concerns of the President. The fact that Congress has been unable to muster
134. See Jacobson, supra note 111, at 1045.
135. L.A. Times, supra note 130.
136. Jacobson, supra note 111, at 1044.
137. Gugliotta, supra note 131, at A33, col. 1.
138. Id.
139. H.R. REP. No. 102-40, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, at 1 (1991).
140. For a discussion of these cases, see infra text accompanying notes 167-74.
141. H.R. 1, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. § 12 (1991) (directed at Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,
490 U.S. 228 (1989)).
142. Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 102(b).
143. Saltzman, supra note 71, at 41-42.
144. Rosenthal, President Tries to Quell Furor on Interpreting Scope of New Law, N.Y.
Times, Nov. 22, 1991, at Al, col. 1.
145. Id.
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enough votes in support of the Family and Medical Leave Act to ensure its
enactment indicates that Congress, too, lacks sufficient commitment to
eradicating gender and racial inequality. It would probably be confronting
the same dilemma with the Civil Rights Act if the Republican Party were
not attempting to improve its public standing. This lack of total congres-
sional support is probably because the groups opposing the measures, namely
the business community, have considerable political influence. Further,
members of Congress have been socialized in the same manner as the rest
of the nation. They have absorbed the roles assigned to the sexes and have
accepted many of them as natural.' 46 Thus, relying upon Congress to initiate
changes that will culminate in the elimination of sex discrimination and
sexist attitudes is unrealistic until members of Congress and their constituents
acknowledge that gender roles and their resultant harms are unacceptable.
Before Congress will override a presidential veto, it must receive signals
that antidiscrimination legislation is supported by the most powerful segment
of American society-the business sector.
III. LIMrTAnoNs OF JUDIcIAL REMEDES
As the nation's arbiter of justice, the judicial system would also appear
to be a logical and appropriate participant in the elimination of sex dis-
crimination. The courts possess an important tool-the power granted them
by Title VII to adjudicate employment discrimination claims.' 47 More im-
portant, the courts are not responsible to constituents in the same manner
as members of Congress. Indeed, judges are valued for their impartial
judgment. They could use these characteristics to combat discrimination by
engaging in a type of judicial activism devoted to reading Title VII and
other statutory provisions broadly while remaining within the scope of
Congressional intent. This ability, however, is counterbalanced by the lim-
itations the Supreme Court has placed upon Title VII. Further, like legis-
lation, any litigation necessarily involves the behavior of individuals. Courts
are not capable of issuing decrees ordering people to alter their ideas and
perceptions. These restraints, combined with the current composition of the
Court, make relying upon litigation as an effective tool in eliminating sex
discrimination unrealistic.
146. This assertion is confirmed by the allegations of sexist behavior on Capitol Hill that
arose during the confirmation hearings of then Judge Clarence Thomas. See Williams, From
Women, an Outpouring of Anger, Wash. Post, Oct. 9, 1991, at Al, col. 1.
147. Title VII provides courts with the power to order employers to change their employment
practices. Schultz, supra note 23, at 1758. An employer who is found guilty of discrimination
may be forced to alter the composition of its workforce or job classifications. Id. The most
important aspect of Title VII adjudications is that individuals not involved in a particular case
may still use its outcome as a guide in bargaining with their own employers. Id. at 1757-58.
Consequently, Title VII has the potential to effect widespread change within the workplace.
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Three Supreme Court decisions of the late 1980s demonstrate the manner
in which Title VII litigation could be used as an effective tool to eliminate
sex discrimination. In Hishon v. King & Spalding,48 the Court held that
partnership decisions in law firms must comply with Title VII.' 49 Thus, the
Court opened the door for discrimination suits involving partnership and
other upper-level management decisions. In California Federal Savings &
Loan Association v. Guerra,'50 the Court held that Title VII and the PDA
were intended to be "floor[s] beneath which pregnancy disability benefits
may not drop-not a ceiling above which they may not rise.' ' 51 Thus, Title
VII and the PDA do not prohibit states from being more liberal than the
federal statutes in enacting antidiscrimination laws. 52
In UAW v. Johnson Controls,'53 the Court held that a company's fetal
protection policy violated Title VII and the PDA by barring only women
from jobs involving actual or potential lead exposure despite evidence that
men could also be adversely affected by similar exposure. 54 The Court
stated: "It is no more appropriate for the courts than it is for individual
employers to decide whether a woman's reproductive role is more important
to herself and her family than her economic role. Congress has left this
choice to the woman as hers to make."' 55 This victory rings a bit hollow
because the work conditions in question were harmful to women, men, and
fetuses. A more desirable result would have been to require Johnson
Controls to install sufficient safety devices to minimize the health hazard
for all workers. Whether the Court could have actually done so is ques-
tionable, however, because the evidence indicated that Johnson Controls
had lowered the lead levels as much as possible.
Despite these triumphs, the Court has made winning Title VII suits more
difficult for plaintiffs. 56 Most important, the Court has increased plaintiffs'
148. 467 U.S. 69 (1984).
149. Id. at 77.
150. 479 U.S. 272 (1987).
151. Id. at 285.
152. Jacobson, supra note 111, at 1020.
153. 111 S. Ct. 1196 (1991).
154. Id. at 1203, 1209-10 (policy prevented women capable of bearing children from working
in battery manufacturing operation that would expose them to high concentrations of lead).
155. Id. at 1210.
156. In-Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989), the Court held that, in
a case alleging discrimination caused by disparate impact, a plaintiff must demonstrate that
the employer's applying "specific or particular" employment practices has caused the disparate
impact. Id. at 657. Showing a disproportionately low percentage of members of the protected
class in the positions in question is not sufficient to establish a prima facie case of discrimi-
nation. Id. Instead, plaintiffs must show that each challenged employment practice has a
significantly disparate impact on employment opportunities for protected and unprotected
groups. Id. Thus, Wards Cove imposes a "specific causation" requirement upon Title VII
plaintiffs. See id.
In Lorance v. AT&T Technologies, 490 U.S. 900 (1989), the Court ruled that the limitations
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burden of proof, which is especially significant in cases alleging covert
discrimination, where proving differential treatment has become nearly
impossible. 57 Such a development is troublesome because, although the
courts have assisted in eliminating formal barriers to the advancement of
women,'58 covert discrimination has not been similarly eliminated and is
likely to become the norm. This is indicated by the manner in which
American society now approaches racial discrimination. Most formal barriers
to African-Americans have indeed been eliminated: few employers would
state, regardless of what they actually believe, that they refuse to hire
minorities; African-Americans may sit wherever they choose on busses and
trains; and racially restrictive covenants have been made illegal. Despite the
apparent elimination of overt discrimination, however, African-Americans
are still experiencing discrimination in a covert form: "no American of
African descent, regardless of status of success, is safe from racial aggression
ranging from an unthinking insult to a life-threatening attack."' 5 9 This
reality indicates that eliminating overt discrimination does not eliminate all
discrimination. Because covert discrimination has become and will continue
to be prevalent, the ability to challenge it in court successfully is crucial.
The current difficulty in proving such behavior, however, renders relying
upon the judiciary to eliminate covert discrimination virtually pointless.16
In her article examining the Supreme Court's approach to discrimination
cases, Schultz argues that the Court's current attitude toward discrimination
differs significantly from the attitude of the courts deciding race discrimi-
nation cases in the late 1960s and early 1970s . 61 She asserts that, in those
cases, the courts viewed "dismantl[ing] workplace discrimination" as their
period for bringing actions under Title VII involving discriminatory seniority systems begins
to run on the date the challenged system is adopted. Id. at 911. This makes bringing such
suits difficult for plaintiffs who may not realize the discriminatory effect of a system until
they are affected by it, which may well occur long after the Title VII limitations period has
expired.
157. Becker, supra note 34, at 939.
158. Schultz, supra note 23, at 1770.
159. Bell, Racism: A Prophecy for the Year 2000, 42 RtrroERs L. REv. 93, 96 (1989).
160. A recent decision demonstrates the manner in which the Court is limited in what it
sees as discrimination. In City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989), the
Court held that Richmond's plan requiring prime contractors with city construction contracts
to subcontract at least 30% of each contract to Minority Business Enterprises (MBEs) violated
the fourteenth amendment's equal protection cladise by denying contracts to individuals on the
basis of race. Id. at 510-11. To justify the plan, the Court indicated that the city must
demonstrate that individual MBEs had "suffered from the effects of past discrimination by
the city or prime contractors." Id. at 508. This holding imposes upon plaintiffs the burden
of establishing that they are victims of discrimination. It marks a definite departure from
earlier race discrimination cases, which did not require plaintiffs to produce individual victims
of discrimination. See Schultz, supra note 23, at 1774.
161. See Schultz, supra note 23, at 1770-75.
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responsibility.' 62 The courts "presumed that continuing patterns of racial
segregation were attributable to historical labor market discrimination."' 16
Consequently, the judiciary took an active role in attempting to eliminate
racial segregation in the workplace. This approach has not been used against
sex discrimination, however. Instead, Schultz argues, "[tlo a large extent,
... the structures of the work world that disempower most working women
from ever aspiring to nontraditional work are left unexamined."' 64 Unlike
their perception that the status of minorities in the workplace is due to
historical discrimination, courts have assumed that the status of women is
due to choices they make before they even enter the workplace,165 indicating
that judges have absorbed society's attitudes toward women and their role
in society.'6 Despite their apparent unwillingness to do so now, the fact
that courts were once willing to actively change the structure of the work-
place and society as a whole indicates that the judiciary should be capable
of engaging in a battle to change society's emphasis on gender roles.
Focusing upon what the courts accomplished over two decades ago as
Schultz does is not sufficient, though, because in the intervening years this
country has witnessed a return to conservatism in the executive branch and,
consequently, in the judiciary. Indeed, the composition and attitudes of the
Supreme Court are now radically different from those of the Court deciding
the first wave of discrimination cases under Title VII. This change is reflected
in the Court's more limited approach to race and sex discrimination cases,
making relying upon the Court to revert to its earlier, committed approach
to eliminating sex discrimination unrealistic.
For example, in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,'67 the majority of the
Court held that once a plaintiff shows that gender played a motivating part
in an employment decision an employer charged with discrimination may
avoid liability only by establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that
the employment decision alleged to be discriminatory would have been made
even in the absence of gender considerations.' 6
The significance of Hopkins is somewhat reduced by the fact that two
of the justices joining in the plurality opinion-Justices Brennan and Mar-
shall-have retired from the Court. Consequently, the dissenting opinion
written by Justice Kennedy and joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justice Scalia may be relevant to predicting future attitudes of the Court.
That opinion states:
162. Id. at 1771.
163. Id. at 1770.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 1756-57.
166. Id. at 1771.
167. 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
168. Id. at 244-45; Barnett, supra note 72, at 227.
[Vol. 67:817
SEX DISCRIMINATION
Title VII creates no independent cause of action for sex stereotyping....
Our cases do not support the suggestion that failure to "disclaim
reliance" on stereotypical comments itself violates Title VII. Neither do
they support creation of a "duty to sensitize." . [A]cceptance of
such theories would turn Title VII "from a prohibition of discriminatory
conduct into an engine for rooting out sexist thoughts."' 69
A similar sentiment was expressed in a 1987 Sixth Circuit case to which the
Court denied certiorari: "Title VII is the federal court mainstay in the
struggle for equal employment opportunity for the female workers of
America. But ... Title VII was [not] designed to bring about a magical
transformation in the social mores of American workers.' 7 0 These excerpts
demonstrate a sentiment in the judiciary that its duties do not include
fundamentally altering the views of society.
Recent decisions of the Court also demonstrate that it is no longer willing
to participate in a widespread effort to eliminate race discrimination. For
example, in Patterson v. McLean Credit Union 7 ' the Court ruled that
section 1981, which prohibits discrimination on the basis of race in the
making and enforcement of contracts, does not apply to conduct during
the execution of the contract. 72 The Court stated: "Section 1981 cannot be
construed as a general proscription of racial discrimination in all aspects of
contract relations, for it expressly prohibits discrimination only in the
making and enforcement of contracts.'1 7 The Court could have interpreted
section 1981 as applying to all aspects of contractual relationships. Such an
interpretation would not be unwarranted because a plaintiff could argue
that the party engaging in the discriminatory conduct intended to behave
in a discriminatory fashion when the contract was formed and, hence, made
the conduct a term of the contract. This action would seemingly violate
section 1981. The Court's interpretation implies, however, that conduct
during the contractual relationship has no relevance to the formation of the
contract. The narrow construction applied by the Court demonstrates its
unwillingness to assume a meaningful role in eliminating race discrimination.
The manner in which the Supreme Court has restricted Title VII, combined
with the current composition of the Court, makes relying upon the judiciary
to effect widespread social change unrealistic. Congress has attempted to
repair the damage wrought by the Court by passing the Civil Rights Act
of 1991, which directly addresses the holdings in Price Waterhouse, Patter-
son, and Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Antonio.7 4
169. Hopkins, 490 U.S. at 294 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
170. Rabidue v. Osceola Refining Co., 805 F.2d 611, 621 (6th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481
U.S. 1041 (1987); see also Frug, supra note 64, at 94 (discussing the courts' reactions to
attempts to change the status quo).
171. 491 U.S. 164 (1989).
172. Id. at 176 (interpreting 42 U.S.C. § 1981).
173. Id.
174. 490 U.S. 642 (1989). See supra note 156 for a discussion of this case.
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Unlike the judiciary, the vehicle for change must be unflaggingly devoted
to the goal of eliminating discrimination. It must not be subject to political
pressures or carry with it seemingly unalterable biases. Ironically, the
workplace-specifically the legal profession-is the ideal vehicle for accom-
plishing the task at hand.
IV. THE LEGAL PROFESSION AS THE KEY TO SoCIAL REFORM
Using the workplace as the vehicle for eliminating sex discrimination is
both sensible and realistic. As has already been discussed, the workplace
exerts significant influence over Congress, so once the attitudes of the
former change so too should those of the latter. Also, now that the
workplace includes both women and men, turning to it is a wise tactical
move. This section argues that one segment of the workplace-the legal
profession-is ideally suited for initiating the entire sector's battle to elim-
inate discrimination. This is due to the nature of the profession itself and
the fact that the profession is uniquely related to the judiciary and legisla-
tures as well as a powerful segment of the workplace.
This section will first demonstrate why the nature of the legal profession
suits it for initiating widespread social change. The remainder of the section
suggests both immediate solutions and long-range goals designed to create
a workplace that is not stratified by gender. Some of the necessary changes
have already begun because the influx of women has moved many employers
to adopt new policies and to restructure existing ones. The policies proposed
here, however, will go further than those already in place because they will
eventually change the attitudes of workers. Therefore, they should also
eliminate gender stratification within the home.
A. The Nature of the Legal Profession
The very nature of the legal profession is what suits it for initiating an
effective battle against discrimination: Lawyers are advocates of justice;
when they become judges they administer justice. A logical corollary to this
view of the profession is that lawyers and judges should ensure that the
laws under which they advocate and which they administer are just. Further,
to avoid being hypocritical, lawyers should devote themselves to fostering
a just society. Consequently, the legal profession should not tolerate any
unjust behavior. Specifically, it should not tolerate laws, behavior, or
attitudes that indicate that any member of society is being treated unfairly
because he or she belongs to a particular segment of society.
These assertions are not without support. The preamble to the ABA
Model Rules of Professional Conduct states, in part:
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[1] A lawyer... [has] special responsibility for the quality of justice.
[4] A lawyer's conduct should conform to the requirements of the law,
both in professional service to clients and in the lawyer's business and
personal affairs.... A lawyer should demonstrate respect for the legal
system and for those who serve it .... [I]t is also a lawyer's duty to
uphold legal process.
[5] As a public citizen, a lawyer should seek improvement of the law,
the administration of justice .... A lawyer should be mindful of
deficiencies in the administration of justice ... and should help the bar
regulate itself in the public interest.
[6] ... A lawyer should strive to ... improve the law and the legal
profession and to exemplify the legal profession's ideals of public service.
[11] .. •. The profession has a responsibility to assure that its regulations
are conceived in the public interest and not in furtherance of parochial
or self-interested concerns of the bar. ... 175
The language of the preamble focuses, to a certain extent, upon the notion
of lawyers as members of a public profession. The preamble makes clear
the duty of the legal profession to actively seek to improve the legal system
and work for the public interest.
The values espoused by the preamble resemble those of the republican
tradition that existed at the birth of this country. 7 6 According to Gordon,
this tradition required lawyers to fulfill both negative and positive roles:
Performing their positive functions entails the assumption of a special
responsibility beyond that of ordinary citizens. They are to repair defects
in the framework of legality, to serve as a policy intelligentsia, recom-
mending improvements in the law to adapt it to changing conditions,
and ... to create and disseminate, both within and without the context
of advising clients, a culture of respect for and compliance with the
purposes of the laws.'"
In the nineteenth century, one of the ideals of lawyers was to engage in
"political reform activity to purify government and the judiciary. '1 7 8 In
modern society, the republican ideal is symbolized by the idea of lawyers
as "guardians of individual rights, the defenders of the legal framework,
and the balance wheel of society.' 
7 9
The language used in these two sources of guidance-the Model'Rules
and the republican tradition-clearly indicate that initiating social reform is
not beyond the realm of the profession. In fact, the lawyer's duty as a
protector of individual rights requires the profession to attempt to eliminate
175. MODEL RUmm oF PROFEsSIoNAL CONDUCT preamble (1990).
176. See Gordon, The Independence of Lawyers, 68 B.U.L. Rv. 1, 13-16 (1988) (arguing
that lawyers must remain independent of their clients' beliefs and positions).
177. Id. at 14.
178. Id. at 16.
179. Id. at 19.
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discrimination-which represents an unjust denial of individual rights-from
all of society.
One member of the judiciary has recently recognized the inherent conflict
created by the existence of gender bias in the legal profession. The Chief.
Justice of the Minnesota Supreme Court stated: "Gender bias affects
everything from the way we address women to our judicial philosophy ....
Gender fairness goes right to the integrity of the entire judicial system. '"180
This recognition led to the creation, by October 1989, of state task forces
on gender bias in the courts in thirty states.' The studies conducted by
these groups have documented the existence of gender bias in the courts
and have created an awareness that refusing to tolerate discrimination of
any type should be an aspect of the judiciary's professional responsibility.8 2
This recognition is symbolized by the reforms initiated in response to the
studies, some of which are proposals to amend state codes of judicial
conduct and professional responsibility to bar gender and other types of
bias. 83 Similar reforms are being made at the national level: the ABA is
considering revisions to the Model Code of Judicial Conduct that explicitly
state that judges are to "perform judicial duties without bias or preju-
dice."184
The history of the legal profession as one in the public service combined
with the recognition by the judiciary that eliminating gender bias is an issue
of professional responsibility demonstrate that the profession is an appro-
priate vehicle for initiating the elimination of sex discrimination. The
profession as a whole should follow the lead of the judiciary and adopt
measures explicitly stating that lawyers should, as part of their duty to the
public, fight to eliminate discrimination.
B. Immediate Solutions: Family-Oriented Policies
Eliminating sex discrimination requires the immediate adoption of policies
that enable workers of both sexes to better combine their work and personal
lives. Such policies include providing parental leaves, flexible work schedules,
and child care. These are especially important to the legal profession because
all too often women lawyers have sacrificed their personal lives in order to
180. Schafran, Gender and Justice, 42 FLA. L. Ray. 181, 195 (1990) (quoting Chief Justice
Popovich's comments at the release of the report of the Minnesota gender bias task force).
181. Id. at 186; see also ABA Report, supra note 62, at 10 n.10 (stating that 18 court-
appointed task forces existed in 1988).
182. See generally Schafran, supra note 180 (discussing reports in Florida, New York, New
Jersey, Minnesota, and Rhode Island).
183. See id. at 194-202. According to Schafran, New York, New Jersey, and Rhode Island
have adopted such reforms. Id.
184. Id. at 200 n.94 (quoting proposed reforms to MODEL CODE OF JUDICUL CONDUCT
Canon 3).
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advance within the profession." 5 Both men and women are no longer
satisfied with limiting their parenting to the best child care available.
8 6
Instead, they want to be actively involved with their families. Adopting the
measures suggested in this section would help destroy the artificial distinction
between public and private spheres by indicating to male and female workers
that their personal lives, which encompass the values normally associated
with the world of the private, are recognized by and linked to their public
roles. Once the public and private are successfully combined, gender roles
will disappear and sex discrimination will be eliminated.
These changes should also result in a more humane workplace and happier
workers. In the legal profession, one of the causes of dissatisfaction cited
by attorneys is the difficulty of combining work with child rearing.
8 7
Eliminating this source of unrest should relieve some of the stress associated
with the profession. 88 Reducing the discontent among attorneys may benefit
firms by reducing the number of attorneys transferring to other areas of
practice or leaving the profession entirely. Approximately 7.5% to 9% of
attorneys make lateral transfers each year, 8 9 with some large firms losing
50% of their associates.' 90 Women are twice as likely as men to expect to
leave the profession. 19' These statistics represent economic losses to firms,
which have invested time and money in training these individuals. 92 There-
fore, attempting to reduce the level of dissatisfaction among attorneys and,
consequently, decrease the likelihood of their transferring to other firms or
professions, is in the best interest of law firms and the profession as a
whole.
1. Parental Leaves and Flexible Work Schedules:
Abandoning the "Mommy Track"
In recent years employers have begun accommodating the needs of work-
ing mothers by enacting provisions for maternity leaves and part-time and
flexible work schedules. But because these policies are directed primarily
toward women, they ensure that women will continue to assume responsi-
bility for child care, perpetuating the very gender roles that must be
destroyed by requiring women to continue to assume primary responsibility
185. See supra text accompanying note 72.
186. ABA Report, supra note 62, at 14; Barnett, supra note 72, at 221.
187. Holmes, supra note 67, at 13. The other areas of lawyer dissatisfaction are: overwork;
hierarchy, bureaucracy and specialization; and moral conflict. Id.
188. See id. at 24. Attorneys experience higher levels of stress, problem drinking, and suicide
than the general population. Id.
189. Id. at 23.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 23-24 (51% among women compared to 21.5% among men).
192. See id. at 23.
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for most domestic duties. This, in turn, causes women to be more handi-
capped than men in the business sector. 93
Despite the discriminatory effects of current policies, it has been argued
that they will eventually enable men to assume child care responsibilities.
In a well-known article, Felice Schwartz encouraged employers to intention-
ally create stratification among female employees by distinguishing between
"career-and-family" and "career primary" women.' 94 The former would be
relegated to a track going no higher than middle management positions,
while the latter would have all obstacles impeding their advancement re-
moved. 9 1 Schwartz defended this strategy by asserting that it "will be a
model in the very near future for men-thus women will not be forced to
continue to take primary responsibility for child care. 1' 96
Creating a "mommy track," however, is more likely to perpetuate than
destroy the idea that women are the primary care givers in American society.
As Representative Patricia Schroeder stated, the mommy track "reinforces
the idea, which is so strong in our country, that you can either have a
family or a career, but not both, if you're a woman."'' '
Even before Schwartz's article was published, women lawyers were and
still are battling with the problems created by the emergence of a mommy
track in the legal profession. 98 Firms have adopted flexible work policies
that include flexible work arrangements, part-time policies, more compre-
hensive maternity leave, and day care assistance.'9 Many women are reluc-
193. Frug, supra note 64, at 57.
194. Schwartz, Management Women and the New Facts of Life, HARv. Bus. REv., Jan.-
Feb. 1989, at 65.
195. See id. Schwartz supported her proposition by referring to unnamed studies and "what
we all know." Within the first paragraph of her article, Schwartz refers to a study by "one
multinational corporation" and another by a "large producer of consumer goods." She goes
on to assert that "we know that women also have a greater tendency to plateau or to interrupt
their careers." Id. at 65. Representative Patricia Schroeder challenged these assertions with
some real facts, stating that "the military has 'studied women to death, hoping for a reason
to get rid of them,' but keeps finding 'that the women are motivated and productive, and
that after they have babies they get right back to work."' Lewin, 'Mommy Career Track' Sets
Off a Furor, N.Y. Times, Mar. 8, 1989, at A18, col. 1 (quoting Rep. Schroeder). Amazingly,
the article that sparked one of the most significant recent debates over women's status in the
work force was based upon the author's unsupported assertions and speculations.
196. Schwartz, The 'Mommy Track' Isn't Anti-Woman, N.Y. Times, Mar. 22, 1989, at
A27, col. 1.
197. Lewin, supra note 195 (quoting Rep. Schroeder); see also Why Not Many Mommy
Tracks?, N.Y. Times, Mar. 13, 1989, at AIS, col. 1; Mommy Track's an Idea Whose Time
Has Gone, N.Y. Times, Apr. 2, 1989, at E30, col. 3; The Mommy Track vs. the Fast Track,
N.Y. Times, May 21, 1989, at F2, col. 2 (excerpts from letters to Harvard Business Review
discussing Schwartz's article).
198. See Kingson, Women in the Law Say Path Is Limited by 'Mommy Track, N.Y. Times,
Aug. 8, 1988, at Al, col. 5 (noting that women are on the bottom of the emerging stratified
profession); McLean, Flex-time Plans Could Solve Child Care Dilemma, L.A. Daily J., Jan.
9, 1989 (California Law Business), at 3 (emphasizing interest of firms in retaining best talent).
199. Barnett, supra note 72, at 221; see Brill, Labor Pains, AM. LAw., Jan.-Feb. 1986, at
1, 15; McLean, supra note 198. Although some firms have formal policies concerning part-
and flex-time, most confront these issues on an ad hoc basis. Id. at 10.
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tant to avail themselves of these policies, however, because they fear doing
so will prevent them from being assigned interesting work and, ultimately,
advancing to partner. 2 Those attorneys who do take leaves are reluctant
to use the additional leave time ordinarily available because they fear that
the "extra" time will affect them negatively in terms of partnership, bonuses,
and compensation °.2 0 Although a survey of Atlanta firms found that most
of the firms with maternity leave policies permitted three months' leave at
full pay and benefits with no impact on career advancement, 20 2 some firms
postpone the partnership decision by at least one year for every fraction of
a year that an associate takes as leave. 203 Some law firms also tell associates
wishing to work part time that doing so will prevent them from becoming
partners .204
Policies creating leaves and flexible schedules are especially important in
the legal profession where the greatest professional demands occur just
before partnership decisions are made and coincide with the age at which
many couples begin to have children. 20 5 Now that there are more two-lawyer
families than ever, more lawyers are confronting the conflicting obligations
of raising families and continuing their careers. 201 Leaves and part-time
work schedules allow workers the time and flexibility needed to fulfill their
family duties.
Firms must consider four factors in adopting policies to eliminate sex
discrimination and gender roles. First, any policies that will be or have been
adopted must be applied without regard to gender. Although current policies
are usually phrased in sex-neutral terms, they are not applied neutrally.
Rather, workers perceive them as a benefit directed toward women. Like
women, most men fear their careers will suffer if they take advantage of
paternity leaves and flexible programs.2 0 7 Thus, although thirty percent of
all companies offer paternity leave, only one percent of the eligible male
workers take advantage of these policies. 208 Men who do choose to use these
benefits are perceived as adopting a woman's role.2°9 For society to relinquish
its notion that women are responsible for child care, employers must realize
that men, too, are interested in being involved in child care: "men are
starting to evaluate practice settings based on their accommodation to family
200. Kingson, supra note 198, at Al, col. 5.
201. Barnett, supra note 72, at 224.
202. Id. at 223-24.
203. Holmes, supra note 67, at 19.
204. See Kingson, supra note 198, at A15, col. 3.
205. S. OKIN, supra note 19, at 176; see Holmes, supra note 67, at 18.
206. Bower, Rethinking Law Firm Organization-The New Pyramid, A.B.A. J., Apr. 1989,
at 90, 94.
207. Saltzman, supra note 71, at 47.
208. Id.
209. Olsen, supra note 2, at 1559; Kingson, supra note 198, at Al.
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responsibilities. ' 210 In a 1982 Stanford Law Review study, seventy-five
percent of the male law students said they would like to take parenting
leave after they started working. 21' Some firms are beginning to reflect these
attitudes, referring to leaves and flexible schedules as "parental" rather
than "maternal" concerns. 2 2 This attitude must now become the rule rather
than the exception.
Second, all firms should adopt parental leave policies that permit attorneys
at least three months' job-protected leave after the birth of a child. These
leaves should be available to both men and women on equal terms.213 In
the best of circumstances, the majority of the time taken for parental leave
should be paid. Additionally, individuals taking leaves should not be ham-
pered unjustly on the partnership track: a week should count as a week,
not a month or a year. A good initial model to follow may be that of the
Family and Medical Leave Act, which would provide twelve weeks of unpaid
leave during the year after the birth or adoption of a child. 214
Third, all firms should adopt part- and flex-time policies that are available
to all attorneys regardless of their parental status. These policies would
symbolize the profession's recognition that attorneys have interests beyond
work. Such an approach is not novel: "the profession has always accom-
modated . . . political involvement, military reserve duty and government
service. ' 215 Firms must ensure that those working on flexible schedules are
adequately compensated. In some cases, women currently working part time
are paid disproportionately less than they should be if their full-time salary
is used as a basis of comparison. 216 They receive inadequate fringe benefits
and are required to sacrifice reasonable employment expectations, such as
achieving partner.217 Indeed, firms do benefit from current policies because
part-time lawyers are billed out at a higher fraction of the average full-time
salary than their part-time salary indicates. 21 8 While both lawyers and firms
should benefit from these policies, neither party should take advantage of
the other. Part-time workers should comply with the targets they set for
210. ABA Report, supra note 62, at 14-15.
211. Holmes, supra note 67, at 18 (Twenty-three percent of men wanted leaves longer than
three months.); see also Brill, supra note 199, at 11 (noting that firms refusing to adopt
policies to accommodate women now may still have to do so for men in the future); LaMothe,
Endangered Species, STkN. LAW., Spring/Summer 1989, at 15, 32 (noting that both women
and men are attempting to place rational boundaries on their jobs).
In a survey of its employees conducted by DuPont, 56% of the males indicated that they
were interested in schedules that would allow them more time with their families. Saltzman,
supra note 71, at 47. This number had increased by 19 percentage points in five years. Id.
212. See Barnett, supra note 72, at 221.
213. S. OKIN, supra note 19, at 176.
214. H.R. 2, § 102, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
215. ABA Report, supra note 62, at 15.
216. Frug, supra note 64, at 57.
217. See id.
218. Brill, supra note 199, at 11.
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themselves, but they should also be fully compensated for their work: if a
part-time lawyer works sixty percent of a full-time lawyer, he or she should
receive sixty percent of his or her full-time salary.
Finally, in addition to providing flexible schedules, firms should become
more flexible about where work can be completed. Firms should be prepared
to permit lawyer-parents to combine their work and family responsibilities
at home. Other attorneys, such as those with excessively long commutes,
could also benefit from such arrangements. Attorneys could be provided
with home -computer terminals, modems, fax machines, and telephones
equipped for conference calls. 2 9 They would then be able to conduct
research, draft memoranda, briefs and other documents, and communicate
with the office and clientsYm Providing lawyers with home equipment will
benefit firms because lawyers will work at times they may not have other-
wise.
2. Child Care
In addition to creating more flexibility, policies must also provide support
for child care. The lack of suitable child care alternatives in the United
States creates "a significant barrier to successful labor market participation
for women,'"'2 so adopting these policies should improve the status of
women.
The workplace must provide long-term support for its workers' child care
needs. While parental leaves are normally available immediately after chil-
dren are born, parents need day-long assistance until their children begin
attending school and occasional assistance for older children who are sick
or need other attention during the day. Obviously, leaves lasting the first
few months of a child's life do not solve this problem. To assist in solving
this dilemma, organizations must begin offering or subsidizing child care
programs. Some firms have already done so: Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher
& Flom provides at-home emergency child care for children under thirteen
if their usual arrangements are not available.m Similarly, Wilmer, Cutler &
Pickering "provides care for healthy children who need emergency babysit-
ters.' '22 The firm has found that its emergency child care facility improved
attorney morale and productivity.? Cravath Swaine & Moore has a program
similar to that at Wilmer, Cutler & Pickering.2 5 Firms have discovered that
219. Barnett, supra note 72, at 222; Kaye, supra note 33, at 124.
220. Barnett, supra note 72, at 222.
221. Frug, supra note 64, at 100.
222. Lawson, 7 Employers Join to Provide Child Care at Home in a Crisis, N.Y. Times,
Sept. 7, 1989, at Al, col. 5.
223. Id. at C12, col. 1.
224. LaMothe, supra note 211, at 31.
225. Id.
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the cost of providing these services is worth the benefits derived from
reducing attorneys' unexpected absences. 226 Such centers should become more
widespread. If parents begin requesting regular on-site day care, firms should
seriously consider granting these requests.
C. Long-Range Goals: Changing Current Attitudes
in the Workplace
In addition to adopting policies that allow workers to balance their careers
and personal lives, the professional world must take steps to change at a
more fundamental level. Long-range goals must focus upon educating
workers and society as a whole. Notions of gender roles must be abandoned,
with a new focus upon individual personalities and interests adopted in their
place. Individuals must be permitted to adopt the roles with which they are
most comfortable regardless of the "appropriateness" of that behavior. The
role of employers in this process should be to recognize the extent to which
gender bias permeates their operational structures, develop an understanding
of how the environment created by these structures influences the behavior
of individuals, and change their operational structures to eliminate that
bias. 227
To negate the effects of tokenism and the discrimination it fosters, 228
employers must recognize that employees, who are extremely conscious of
their work environment, attempt, either consciously or unconsciously, to
make decisions conforming to that environment. Although this behavior
currently serves to perpetuate discrimination, it could also be used to destroy
it. Once employers realize they have created a discriminatory work environ-
ment, whether through intentional or unintentional policy decisions, they
should take affirmative steps to change it.
A primary objective should be to ensure that women are given fair
performance evaluations and are promoted according to their worth, not
their sex. To do this, employers must recognize that employees are often
judged according to stereotypes associated with groups to which they belong
rather than by their individual performance. 229 Even if employees are judged
individually, stereotypes may cause their performance to be reinterpreted
according to the stereotypes. 2 0
All decision makers and employees must learn to respect the work
performed by women. They must learn that being too personal or familiar,
flirting, and referring to appearance and family plans indicate to women
226. Barnett, supra note 72, at 222.
227. See R. KANTER, MEN AND WOMEN OF THE CORPORATION 264 (1977).
228. See text accompanying notes 49-63.
229. See Taub, supra note 21, at 353.
230. See id.
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that they and their work are not being taken seriously. 23 1 Basically, employers
must recognize that any behavior or comments that bring a worker's gender
to the fore are inappropriate and may cause the employee to question her
competence. 232 Being so aware of an employee's gender may also cause that
employee to be evaluated unfairly.233
Some companies have sponsored "diversity training" programs designed
to teach employees to understand and value the differences between men
and women. 234 These programs are partially in response to the number of
women who have been leaving corporations. 235 Employers have realized that
they must create supportive work environments rather than focus on policies
designed to soothe small parts of the bigger malady.236 A vice-president at
Pepsi-Cola stated that, after undergoing diversity training, he is more likely
to hire someone with a point of view different from his own.23 7
Although these programs are a step in the right direction, discussing the
differences between the sexes is not sufficient to eliminate gender bias, for
some of these "differences" are what must be abandoned. In addition,
employees should be educated concerning the qualities attributed to each
sex and encouraged to adopt for themselves those qualities they view as
positive. This should be done without regard to whether that quality is
"appropriate" for the employee's sex. This process should create good
people instead of good men or good women. The workplace should benefit
from employees who have evaluated themselves and abandoned their gender-
specific roles.
Programs designed to educate individuals about the pervasiveness and
detrimental effects of gender bias have been adopted by segments of the
judiciary. These programs are the result of the gender bias task force
movement that was started in order to inform the judiciary about the
manner in which gender bias affects judges' decision making and other
court behavior.238 The task forces have resulted in the creation of court
handbooks defining and discussing gender bias and have made gender bias
a topic of judicial education programs. 239 The changes implemented after
New Jersey's task force report are the only ones to have been evaluated,
and many areas the task force examined have improved significantly: "[T]he
task force has succeeded in 'creating a climate within the court system in
231. Id. at 357-58.
232. See id. at 357.
233. Id.
234. Saltznman, supra note 71, at 44.
235. Id.
236. See id.
237. Id.
238. Schafran, supra note 180, at 183. For further discussion of this movement, see supra
notes 180-84 and accompanying text.
239. Id. at 194-202.
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which the nature and consequences of judicial gender bias are both ac-
knowledged to exist and understood to be unacceptable ...... M2 The results
of the judicial task force movement demonstrate that educational programs
concerning gender bias may be an effective way to address the problem of
gender discrimination.
Although instituting educational programs similar to diversity training
and the judiciary's gender bias seminars will require time and expense by
employers, the programs should prove worthwhile by creating a more
humane workplace. Regardless of the time and expense that will be required,
eliminating gender bias should no longer be considered optional.
Once employers commit themselves to instituting these programs, they
should also acknowledge their responsibility for educating future employees.
In the legal profession, this means that attorneys and their firms must work
to eliminate discrimination in law schools. 241 They must make law students
aware of the consequences of engaging in overt and covert discrimination. 242
These efforts are necessary because only after discrimination is confronted
at all levels will it be condemned and defeated.
V. CONCLUSION
The patterns that have emerged in the legal profession indicate that to
truly eliminate sex discrimination employers must become more flexible to
all workers and recognize the role they have played in perpetuating gender
discrimination. First, employers must abandon the expectation that workers
can and will be totally dedicated to their careers while some "other" takes
care of their family responsibilities. Employers can no longer require workers
to sacrifice all other aspects of their lives to advance in the workplace.
They must recognize that all workers have commitments beyond the office,
be they to families, lovers, friends, or hobbies, and adopt positive provisions
allowing for such obligations. Once these adjustments are made, employers
will be prepared to facilitate the equal participation of men and women
both in and out of the workplace. 243
Immediate solutions require employers to acknowledge the personal lives
of employees and to restructure their time demands accordingly. 244 They
240. Id. at 198.
241. See id. at 207-08.
242. See Barnett, supra note 72, at 223.
243. See Powers, supra note 4, at 106 (still discussing these changes in terms of public and
private). Powers supports the idea of adopting a uniform policy on maximum working hours
that would cover both managerial and nonmanagerial employees. Id. at 106-09. Such legislation,
however, only creates the artificial impression that individuals want to and are comfortable
with spending more time away from work. To accomplish effective and permanent change,
such behavior must be freely chosen rather than structurally imposed.
244. S. OKIN, supra note 19, at 176.
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should adopt policies allowing leaves and flexible work schedules that
incorporate several features. First, leaves and flexible scheduling should be
available to workers of both sexes, not just women. Second, any notion of
"tracking" must be abandoned. All workers should be expected to have
and participate in responsibilities outside the workplace. Therefore, working
part time should not hinder an individual's advancement. Third, workers
choosing to adhere to flexible schedules should be adequately compensated
for their work. Finally, employers should be willing to supply workers with
equipment for their homes that will allow them to combine work and family
responsibilities or personal interests. Firms must also provide some sort of
support for child care, be it through on-site day care centers or subsidies
for other forms of child care.
Long-range goals must focus upon changing the attitudes of individuals
in the workplace and society as a whole. While the suggested immediate
solutions should begin this process, more fundamental changes are needed.
Employers must analyze their organizational climates and eliminate any
aspects of them that promote discrimination. Creating a more egalitarian
work environment should allow women to lose their token status and be
accepted as an integral part of the work force. It should also permit both
sexes to work and behave in manners that are most comfortable to them
rather than require them to assume socially constructed behavior patterns.
While these suggestions are by no means exhaustive, they illustrate the
types of modifications necessary to change the work environment. Any new
policies that recognize and support the personal lives of workers, regardless
of sex, should be satisfactory. Once these modifications are made, society
will have started on the road to adopting notions of human rights and
equality and eliminating sexual inequality.
Once the legal profession specifically commits itself to eliminating dis-
crimination, it should use its influence with the other segments of the public
sector to convince them that they, too, should join in the battle. As counsel
to the business sector, lawyers are in a perfect position to exert such
influence. Once that sector as a whole has decided to eliminate discrimi-
nation, Congress will be influenced by those changes and legislate accord-
ingly. Further, when lawyers who are products of the new legal profession
become judges and legislators, the attitudes of those segments of the public
sphere will be permanently altered. Changes in the public will influence the
private sphere because workers will carry their new attitudes into their
homes. The public's recognition and acceptance of the private will erase
the sex-based distinction between public and private and eliminate the notion
of gender roles. Consequently, society as a whole will be fundamentally
altered-in a positive manner.
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